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Abstract 
Having notoriously escaped the operation table to be cut open for a full intestine 
check-up, the anatomy of the acclaimed ‘troops for influence’- assumption finally 
faces a full body search. Although appearing to be somewhat of a tacitly accepted 
‘truth’ both in the academic and political world, there is confusion as to how we 
might actually understand the assumption of ‘troops for influence’ and what it 
entails, as no one seems to have a clear image of how to address it. So how can we 
understand the assumption of ‘troops for influence’? The aim of the thesis is to 
develop preliminary conceptual building-blocks and a tentative analytical model as 
a basis for the future development of a ‘troops for influence’-theory. Through a 
building-block procedure, the assumption will be deconstructed and possible ways 
to understand and define its various components: ‘troops’ and ‘influence’ sought. 
Thereinafter, attention will be brought to understanding why one could expect the 
assumption to be valid in the first place, as well as how such a relationship might 
unfold in practice. As such, this thesis will constitute a pure theoretical contribution 
to the subject in question, illustrating the assumption by Norway’s experience in 
Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta. 
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1 Introduction 
The acclaimed ‘troops for influence’- assumption appears to be somewhat of an 
unchallenged ‘truth’. It comes across as widely known and accepted – both within 
academia and in politics itself – either directly or indirectly. On the one hand, the 
assumption can be found directly mentioned and used in both official government 
documents and academic literature, such as inter alia the Canadian Parliament 
report from 2000, where the Canadian traditional approach towards NATO is 
claimed one of “trading troops for influence” (Canadian Parliament 2000); or 
Græger (2002, 2005) and Strömvik (2006) who both refer to “a ‘troops for 
influence’-strategy” when addressing in particular the Norwegian strategy vis-à-vis 
the EU’s security and defense policy at the beginning of the 21st century. 
On the other hand, ‘troops for influence’ is also indirectly referred to in the 
literature. For example, Lee-Ohlsson (2009) and Knutsen (2010) both hold that 
contributions to military operations may lead to influence when respectively writing 
about small state influence in the CSDP and Norwegian participation in the 
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). There are also those who state that 
“boots on the ground” is of significance for influence within the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) (Rottem 2008), or authors such as Rieker (2004a/b, 
2006) who indirectly challenges the assumption’s scope by stating that Norway as 
a non-member of the EU do not have any influence despite its active participation. 
This opens up for yet another notion, as the assumption apparently is applied both 
to members and non-members of an organization. Thus, the assumption really 
comes to the fore when third-states – without binding commitments – choose to 
participate in international security and defense within the framework of an 
organization where they lack formal membership. Still, we see several examples of 
this happening, such as Norway, Turkey or even Iceland (who does not have a 
standing military) in the CSDP (Tardy 2014), or Sweden in NATO (Edström 2010). 
 Taken together, these examples paint a picture of an assumption that is almost 
tacitly accepted as a given, yet it has never actually been put under serious scrutiny 
– not to mention having it tested or operationalized. In particular, due to inconsistent 
references and use in the literature in terms of definitions and refinements, it 
becomes quite difficult to draw any conclusions on what ‘troops for influence’ 
actually or potentially may entail. So, how can we understand the assumption of 
‘troops for influence’? Before we can even begin to talk about how it can be 
properly tested in a specific case, we therefore need to get a grip of what the 
assumption of ‘troops for influence’ actually entails, and thus: what we would be 
testing.   
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1.1  Aim and Research Question 
In light of what has been said above – that it appears like no one has a clear 
understanding of how to view, define or address the assumption of ‘troops for 
influence’ itself, nor its components – it is high time that these issues are addressed. 
Although there are indications in the literature of diverging views in connection to 
the limitations of the assumption’s validity – such as the lack of formal membership 
(Rieker 2004a/b, 2006), this discussion is ripped of any value until we are all 
actually talking about the same things. It is therefore deemed necessary with a 
clearer understanding and definition of both the assumption’s components: ‘troops’ 
and ‘influence’, as well as the assumption itself, and last but not least, how it may 
be expected to unfold in practice.  
The aim of this thesis is therefore to conduct a first attempt at developing 
conceptual building-blocks and a tentative analytical model to serve as a 
preliminary basis for future development of ‘troops for influence’- theory. Thus, in 
achieving this aim, this thesis will address the following research question: 
 
How can we understand the assumption of ‘troops for influence’? 
1.2 Scientific Relevance and Contribution 
As has already been underlined, there is a gap in the literature when it comes to how 
we can understand the assumption of ‘troops for influence’ and what it might entail. 
Even though it is being referred to in various circumstances, no one has subjected 
the assumption to serious scrutiny – investigating both its components, as well as 
the alleged link between them. The apparent irony is this: although the assumption 
of ‘troops for influence’ itself constitutes a theoretical concept, it has never been 
properly investigated or understood. What can be found however, is a vast literature 
covering related subjects such as inter alia participation in international military 
operations or organizations (Rottem 2008) and conditions for third-state 
participation in such (Bove & Elia 2011); cooperation within international security 
and defense (Rieker 2006 & Lee-Ohlsson 2009); military contributions more 
generally (Johansen et al. 2007); and conceptual discussions and research on 
‘influence’ and/or ‘power’ (Dahl 1957; Mokken & Stokman 1975; Zimmerling 
2005) – just to mention a few. Still, no one has tackled the assumption head-on 
before, incorporating and discussing all of these elements. 
In short, this thesis will therefore constitute a heavy theoretical and conceptual 
contribution to the discussion of ‘troops for influence’, addressing both its 
components and the imagined relationship between them – thereby attempting to 
fill the gap of what is clearly lacking in the literature: a theoretical and conceptual 
understanding of the acclaimed ‘troops for influence’-assumption. Moreover, a 
particular contribution in this regard will be to reveal indications of what types and 
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levels of influence might be expected when a third state contributes to an 
international military operation. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
In fulfilling the abovementioned aims, this thesis will be structured in the following 
way: First, this thesis will start out by presenting the chosen methodological 
framework, explaining and motivating the choices for how the thesis will be 
conducted (2). Second, the assumption of ‘troops for influence’ will be 
deconstructed and each component: ‘troops’ (3) and ‘influence’ (4), will be 
presented in turn, providing a thorough review and discussion on how we can 
understand and define them respectively. For the purposes of the thesis, a specific 
definition and interpretation will be chosen in order to serve as the foundation for 
the later theoretical and conceptual discussions and analysis. 
Third, the following chapters will investigate the alleged link between ‘troops’ 
and ‘influence’, starting with the application of different complementary theoretical 
frameworks in order to gain a better understanding of why ‘troops’ are expected to 
lead to ‘influence’ in the first place (5). Thereinafter, the thesis will embark on the 
challenge of trying to understand how the relationship between ‘troops’ and 
‘influence’ may look like (6). This will be done with the help of the previously 
presented conceptual and theoretical discussions, in addition to the developed 
conceptual building-blocks, which will serve as a staring-point from which we can 
derive inspiration for a tentative analytical model for ‘troops for influence’. 
 Fourth, the thesis will thereinafter present its proposed analytical model, 
composed of all the conceptual building-blocks developed in their respective 
chapters. Finally, a preliminary “test-case” will help illustrate the possible 
relevance of the analytical model and its constitutive conceptual building-blocks as 
a starting point for a future theory of ‘troops for influence,’ before a conclusion is 
presented. 
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2 Methodology 
One reason why the assumption of ‘troops for influence’ has yet to be further 
explored in any shape or form, might exactly be the somewhat apparent 
methodological challenges and pitfalls luring in its shadows. Not only has it never 
been thoroughly researched up until this date – which in itself poses a challenge for 
any researcher who attempts to tread new ground – but it falls within the sensitive 
field of security and defense policy, which might complicate the availability of 
empirical material. However, despite these obstacles, and although one is 
constrained to simply uncover indications of certain situations rather than making 
concrete claims, it is still regarded a valuable contribution to provide a tentative 
theoretical and conceptual basis for further research on the subject That said, we 
will now shortly present how this research will be conducted. 
2.1 Approach: Theory-Development through a 
Building-Block-Procedure 
First, we have to reiterate that this thesis aims to represent a first attempt at 
developing preliminary, conceptual building-blocks and a tentative analytical 
model for future development of a ‘troops for influence’- theory. In order to achieve 
this objective, the research will thereby mainly consist of something similar to what 
is a so-called ‘building-block’-procedure, as the main focus will be directed towards 
third-states in international endeavors. A ‘building-block’-procedure is according 
to George & Bennet (2005:76-77) a well-defined, smaller-scope study of a subclass 
of a general phenomenon, identifying common patterns. If translated to our case, 
one could say that while ‘troops for influence’ would be our general phenomenon, 
‘third-states in international security and defense structures’ would relate to a 
subclass of the assumption.  
The motivation for the abovementioned approach is twofold: first, some 
refinements with regard to the scope of the study is deemed a necessary condition 
for the study’s feasibility. Second, in line with what was argued in the introduction, 
the application of ‘troops for influence’ on third-states puts the assumption to the 
fore. As such, our preliminary findings, as represented by the conceptual building-
blocks and analytical model, will primarily be based on a ‘third-state’- experience 
in the CSDP. This simultaneously means that it is easier to rule out the impact of 
formal membership in indicating ‘influence’ as a result of ‘troops’. Moreover, 
throughout the text, examples will be made with reference to Norway which will 
thereby serve as a red thread in this thesis, guiding the reader along. 
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Having clarified the overarching approach of this thesis, we now move on to 
how this will be solved in practical terms. In fulfilling the aim of the thesis and 
addressing the research question, the assumption will first be deconstructed in order 
to deduct possible and more specific understandings and definitions of its 
fundamental components: ‘troops’ and ‘influence’, and their possible substance, 
relevance and variations. With a basis in the chosen definitions, conceptual 
building-blocks for ‘troops’ and ‘influence’ respectively will be derived. Second, 
the alleged link between ‘troops’ and ‘influence’ is put under scrutiny, and again 
inspiration for the conceptual building-blocks will be found in the theoretical and 
conceptual assessments applied throughout. Thereinafter, the analytical model of 
‘troops for influence’ will be composed of all the conceptual building-blocks 
presented in the previous chapters. 
It is imperative to repeat, however, that the author of thesis does not claim to 
actually develop a theory on ‘troops for influence’, but rather conduct a first attempt 
at developing a preliminary basis for future and further development and testing. 
This cannot be stressed enough.  
2.2  “Case-Selection” 
Before motivating the choice of “case”, it must be pointed out that this research will 
not conduct any case-studies as such, as it is a purely theoretical contribution. That 
said, in order to illustrate the potential relevance of the conceptual building-blocks 
and analytical model developed in this thesis, a pilot-study – in lack of a better word 
– will be conducted to help shed light on the theoretical preliminary findings and 
give a small indication of its relevance. Thus, “case” is here in quotation marks as 
the forthcoming case-selection is not to be confused with an actual ‘case-selection 
for the purpose of conducting a case-study’, but rather motivation for the choice of 
pilot-study. In other words: the pilot-study is not a case-study as such of the 
Norwegian contribution to Operation European Union Naval Forces 
(EUNAVFOR) Atalanta (hereinafter referred to as ‘Operation Atalanta’), but 
constitutes a preliminary “test-case” of the developed conceptual building-blocks 
and analytical model. 
In short, Norway in Operation Atalanta (2009-2010) as the case for our pilot-
study, is purposely chosen. This is due to several regards. First of all, the Norwegian 
participation within the CSDP constitutes a third-state experience. Second, it is a 
matter of available empirical material. As already mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter, security and defense policy is a sensitive subject-area. Still, a lot of the 
existing literature that – to some extent or another – touch upon the ‘troops for 
influence’ assumption is related to Norwegian participation in international 
operations or security and defense organizations, in particular within a NATO or 
CSDP context (see for instance Rieker 2006; Rottem 2008; or Henriksen 2013). 
Third, this choice has to do with the fact that the concept of ‘troops for influence’ 
has previously been used to name Norway’s strategy towards the CSDP (Græger 
2002:73). 
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Last, but not least, in line with what will be argued in later chapters, the 
Norwegian contribution to Operation Atalanta constitutes a substantial contribution 
– both in terms of size, risk and capabilities, and – as will be shown – therefore 
corresponds to our upcoming definition of ‘troops’. As the two previous Norwegian 
contributions to EU-led military operations did not meet up to these standards, this 
further strengthens the motivation.1 
2.3 Data-Collection 
This thesis will rely on both primary and secondary material in its quest to perform 
a qualitative study of how to understand the assumption of ‘troops for influence’. 
In line with what has been mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, this thesis 
is dealing with an under-researched subject that in addition falls within the field of 
security and defense, making it hard to gather empirical data as this concerns 
sensitive questions of national security and influence. As a consequence, it is 
difficult to get access to relevant information, and there is not much official 
documents available. In addition – an in particular in light of the third-state status 
of Norway – these processes are often run through informal channels, complicating 
data-collection even further. According to Schultze & Avital (2011) interviews 
have the perk that they can generate contextual accounts of participant’s 
experiences and their interpretation of them (in Doody & Noonan 2013). As such, 
the main empirical data in this thesis will be based on interviews with people who 
actually take part in these processes, as it is hard to come by this information 
otherwise.  
Thus, in fulfilling the aims of this thesis, it will first turn to open-ended informal 
interviews with national military and political staff and representatives in order to 
get a brief overview of the case. As there is no previous study that has approached 
the assumption of ‘troops for influence’ head on, informal interviews are deemed 
an important and highly valuable introduction to a subject in a field where these is 
not a lot of research conducted (Doody & Noonan 2013).  
Most importantly, the author has also managed to get a formal interview with 
the Counselor for Security and Defense Policy at the Mission of Norway to the EU. 
This semi-structured interview will constitute the main empirical material in the 
pilot-study. Although the disadvantage may be that a big part of the material is 
based on personal perceptions and interpretation, the conducted interview will still 
manage to highlight important indications concerning the assumption, and thereby 
contribute to a better understanding of it.  This also leads us to the advantage of 
semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions: while relying on 
predetermined questions, the researcher is nonetheless able to seek clarification or 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Norway only contributed with one person to Operation Concordia (MFA 2012#2). Norway has contributed with 
62 personnel to Operation EUFOR Althea (MoD 2004), and has also contributed to European Union Police 
Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Hercegovina. For more information, see http://www.euforbih.org/. 
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come up with follow-up questions on issues that arise spontaneously (Doody & 
Noonan 2013). 
However, the thesis will not solely be based on material from interviews, but 
also rely heavily on primary sources such as theoretical and conceptual 
contributions to related subjects by renowned scholars as well as official documents 
and political agreements. In addition, secondary literature will also be put to use, in 
particular with regard to how we can understand ‘troops’ and ‘’influence’ 
respectively, but also in the final analysis to back up arguments presented there. 
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3 Deconstructing the Assumption: 
‘Troops’ 
The following chapter sets out to provide possible understandings and variations 
and a definition of ‘troops’, and how we can view this component of the assumption 
of ‘troops for influence’. In analytical terms, ‘troops’ would constitute the ‘X’ that 
(plausibly) causes ‘Y’ (‘influence’) to happen. Thus, in order to understand the link 
between these two variables, we first need to get a grip of what ‘troops’ might 
signify. In order for the link between these two to be explored in detail in a later 
chapter, both components must first be assessed independently. 
Perhaps not as equally versatile, difficult to comprehend and fully grasp as 
‘influence’, the concept or term ‘troops’ may indeed invite to conceptual 
discussions with regard to how it can be defined and understood. Most people know 
and understand what it is, but when asked to define it, they might become insecure 
as to its specific meaning and definition.  
In order to define and understand ‘troops’ for the purposes of this thesis, the 
following chapter is structured in three main parts. The understanding and 
definition of  ‘troops’ will be developed in heaps, where each sections builds on 
what was discussed and decided in the previous section. Necessary delineations will 
be made underway, respecting the aim of the thesis as well as its feasibility. The 
first section therefore sets out to understand what ‘troops’ might actually mean and 
refer to, starting with a deep-dive into its possible linguistic meaning and nature. It 
will moreover start the deliberation on how we can view ‘troops’ as a component 
of the ‘troops for influence’-assumption. Moreover, ‘troops’ as a concept will be 
followed up in the next section where it is elaborated upon in which context and 
within which frameworks ‘troops’ are at play. Finally, a definition for the purposes 
of this thesis is presented, and what constitutes the first conceptual building-block 
in the later analytical model. 
3.1  ‘Troops’: What, and Within Which Framework? 
As a starting-point, we can first look at the linguistic meaning of ‘troops’ by turning 
to the Oxford Dictionaries’ (2014) definition of ‘troops’ as “soldiers or armed 
forces”. In turn, ‘a soldier’ is defined as “a person who serves in an army” (Ibid. 
(emphasis added)). Relying on these definitions, we can argue that ‘troops’ 
excludes civil personnel such as police officers or lawyers. Instead, ‘troops’ is to be 
defined and understood in military terms. Moreover, the definitions above point to 
another aspect: whether or not ‘troops’ necessarily involve arms or military 
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equipment in addition to the personnel, or maybe even bigger sorts of military 
materiel such as fighter planes, warships or tanks. If ‘troops’ is to be understood as 
‘armed forces serving in the army’, then it could be interpreted as ‘armed military 
personnel’, or ‘arms and military personnel’. Although not constituting our final 
definition, it is yet helpful by pointing us in a direction in which ‘military’ will be 
of decisive factor. 
Having initially touched upon the linguistic meaning of the word ‘troops’, we 
now turn to its possible conceptual meaning, that is: how we can understand the 
concept of ‘troops’ as a component in our assumption. First, ‘troops’ can be 
understood as ‘military contributions’. In a report from 2002 on the Canadian 
implications stemming from the transformed NATO and the evolution of 
peacekeeping, some voices argue that Canada has always traded troops for 
influence within NATO, and that in order to exercise influence within the Alliance, 
military contributions must be increased (Canadian Parliament 2000, emphasis 
added). The understanding of the component ‘troops’ as a contribution is 
furthermore shared by Græger (2002), who has claimed that Norway’s approach to 
the then European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP, now CSDP) could be 
termed “a “troops-for-influence” strategy, where Norwegian political influence in 
the ESDP structure [was] sought through the contribution of forces to the EU 
headline Goals” (Græger 2002:35).2  Even more explicitly spelled out in words, 
Græger claims that “the aim of the «troops-for-influence» strategy is to gain 
political influence in return for force contribution” (Ibid: 73). 
A second possible understanding can again be derived from Nina Græger who 
in her article in Carvalho & Neumann (forthcoming) explores how both defense 
procurement, and military contributions to international peacekeeping and military 
operations can serve as means to achieve ‘status’ internationally, through what she 
terms a ‘forces-for-status’-policy.3 
It is not unimaginable that ‘troops’ as a component in the assumption of ‘troops 
for influence’ can refer to either military contributions to international efforts, 
defense procurement, or even the mere possession of military capabilities in 
general, or maybe even as combinations or the total sum of them all together. 
However, for the purposes of this thesis, defense procurement and the total 
possession of military capabilities will not be considered an embodiment of our 
concept ‘troops’. To the contrary, these notions are rather regarded as facilitators, 
and a condition for having a competitive defense policy capable of facing the 
security challenges of the 21st century. The argument here would be that they are 
seen as integrated elements in the modernization of national defense and security 
and defense policies – thereby enabling military contributions to international 
efforts in a modern world, in particular through the development of niche 
capabilities (Græger forthcoming). Moreover, although this thesis will understand 
‘troops’ as military contributions, the notions of defense procurement and 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 Norway decided to contribute to the new European Reaction Force with an entire newly established task force 
of 3500 personnel at the capability conference in November 2000. This task force was thus was made available 
to the EU’s Headline goal (Rieker 2004b:378).  
3 Defense procurement in itself might symbol willingness to cooperate and a sense of solidarity, and may 
therefore like Græger (forthcoming) hints to, lead to increased recognition. 
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possession of military capabilities may still help to indicate a possible explanation 
to the underlying logic of the assumption itself , when attention is brought to power 
politics and the balance of powers, which we will come back to in a later chapter. 
So, to recapture: we have come down to viewing the concept of ‘troops’ as a 
military contribution. Having previously indicated that, linguistically, ‘troops’ 
might include both military personnel and equipment/materiel, it thus amounts to a 
preliminary definition of ‘troops’ as ‘contribution(s) of military personnel and 
equipment’.4 
That said, even though we have chosen a focus on military aspects for our 
preliminary understanding, it does not automatically exclude factors such as 
administrative and economic support and costs. For instance, one could argue that 
that provisions of troops necessitates a simultaneous administrative cost and effort 
– having to follow the development and administering the troops, both logistically, 
operationally, and tactically. Moreover, troops cost (Johansen et al. 2007). 
Therefore, ‘troop-contributors’ also have an economic expense on top the physical 
troop-contribution alone. However, for the purposes of this thesis, all these factors 
can be seen as one big package, where a ‘troop contribution’ includes ensuing 
administrative and economic costs and efforts.  
Still – and linked to what is said above – the question remains whether 
contributions without actually sending troops will lead to influence, that is if a 
contribution consists of solely administrative military staff and/or economic means. 
For instance, NATO (2012) lists ‘troop- contributions’ as both that of personnel, 
equipment, and resources to a mission. However, like Johansen et al (2007:18) 
indicate, whereas economic contributions alone may help strengthening an 
organization’s ability to solve its tasks, it is substantial ‘troop contributions’ to 
many operations which is deemed necessary to increase one’s recognition and 
influence. While the contribution of one or more administrative military officers 
alone to an operational headquarter could count as a ‘troop contribution’ to some 
extent, it would – for reasons that will be explained and addressed later in the 
following section – not constitute a substantial ‘troop contribution’ in this regard. 
Having discussed what ‘troops’ may entail, we now move on to the possible 
contexts or frameworks for ‘troop-contributions’. 
3.2 Context and Framework for ‘Troop-
Contributions’ 
In which context and within which frameworks are ‘troop contributions’ made, who 
are making them, and what could constitute a substantial ‘troop contribution’? 
These will be the guiding questions for the section to come. However, we will 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 For the purposes of this thesis, there is no reason to make further distinctions between the use of respectively 
‘military’-, ‘force’-, or ‘troops’- contributions in the literature, as they are generally perceived to be 
interchangeable: talking about the same thing. Thus, although seen as synonymous, the thesis will hereinafter use 
‘troop contribution’ in order to create consistency in the text. 
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depart from the assumption that ‘troop contributions’ in some way or another can 
be understood as making ‘troops’ available to some kind of international efforts or 
undertakings – broadly understood as international operations. Moreover, it is also 
assumed that it is states that constitute the ‘troop contributors’, as the authority to 
apply force lies with states and their governments (Smith 2010:3),5 and thus third-
states in this thesis. In an article discussing what kind of operations Norway should 
participate in, Johansen et al. (2007) bring forth five aspects in their operational 
assessment: size and duration of the operation, risk, capabilities and structural 
elements, as well as association (2007:29-34). Although closely inter-connected, 
these five aspects will help structure the discussion in the following discussion, 
highlighting essential characteristics of ‘troop-contributions’ and the possible 
frameworks within which they operate. 
3.2.1 Association 
The association-aspect first concerns the circumstantial framework for the ‘troop-
contribution’. According to Johansen et al. (2007:42) there is an increasing number 
of cooperation-structures constituting the framework of international operations to 
which states contribute with ‘troops’. Operations can be led either unilaterally, such 
as by the US in Iraq (Græger forthcoming);6 bilaterally, or multilaterally by 
respectively the EU, NATO, or the UN, and finally by Coalitions of The Willing 
(Dee 2001), like ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn’ in Libya 2011 (Norwegian Armed 
Forces 2012) (Græger forthcoming:14). All of these are therefore deemed to 
constitute security and defense structures, capable of representing the formal 
framework for international operations. 
Second, Johansen et al (2007) link the association-aspect to the objective for 
participation in international operations, making a distinction between realpolitik, 
self-interest and operations led by the USA, EU or NATO on the one side; with the 
more idealist motives and returns, and contributions to the UN on the other side 
(2007:11,41).7 However, it does not matter to which security and defense structure 
a state contributes to. What counts is that state’s association to either of these formal 
frameworks, especially in established international organizations such as the UN, 
NATO or the EU – namely whether or not it is a formal member or a third-state like 
Norway in the CSDP-operations (Tardy 2014), or partner country like Sweden in 
NATO operations (Edström 2010). The notion of membership is of importance as 
it has implications for the troop-contributing state’s formal decision-making 
powers, rights and obligations.8  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 Troop-contributions, or the use of military power, may be seen as an integrated part of a state’s foreign policy. 
It is after all, the government that defines and enforces national state interests abroad through its foreign policy 
(Stern 1995, in Fermann 2007:32). For instance, NATO does not possess any military forces of its own but relies 
on the contributions of its members and partner countries (NATO 2012). 
6 Please note that Græger specifically states ”percieved US unilateralism” in powet-war Iraq (emphasis added). 
7 See also Græger forthcoming. 
8 Coalitions of the Willing must here be distinguished from the other frameworks as they operate on an ad hoc 
basis (Dee 2001), where membership is not a question. 
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After determining what security and defense structures can represent the 
framework of international operations, one central question remains: what kinds of 
‘international operations’ can states contribute to? There are various types of 
operations. For instance, NATO distinguishes between 7 different scenarios, 
including inter alia peace-keeping, peace-making, crisis management or counter-
terrorism (Norheim-Martinsen et al. 2011:10). However, as Johansen et al. 
(2007:13) point out, the lines between these can be blurry, and it might be hard to 
distinguish them in practice as operations often involve elements of more than one, 
and we will hence only refer to them as ‘international military operations’.  
Having said that, however, while remembering the linguistic clarification made 
earlier, it is the view of this thesis that ‘international operations’ is to be understood 
as ‘international military operations’ – that is, operations to which states contribute 
with military personnel and equipment. In such an understanding, both ‘troop-
contributions’ to a stand-by force such as the National Reaction Force (NRF) and 
the EU Battle Groups (EUBG) (Ministry of Defense (MoD) 2014), as well as 
contributions with direct deployability to military missions.  
Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, it is believed that it is not so much the 
formal title of the operation itself that matters (i.e. crisis-management vs. 
peacekeeping), or which ‘category’ it fits into, but rather the nature and 
characteristics of the operation and ‘troop contribution’ – which will now be 
explored. To that end, the following sections will retrieve inspiration from the 
remaining aspects from Johansen et al. (2007), hopefully altogether highlighting 
what is meant by ‘substantial troop contributions’. 
3.2.2 Size and Duration 
For Johansen et al. (2007) the second and third operational assessments are size and 
duration of contributions, which are closely related to what effect a state may wish 
to achieve with the resources it has at hand. This then sums up to whether a state 
(Norway) should provide few but big or many small contributions, and as such, is 
furthermore linked to number. Does a state have to contribute to many operations 
in order to get ‘influence’, or is it also possible to look at one isolated incident?  
In order to be recognized as a valuable partner however, contributions must be 
big enough to be regarded as substantial and they have to be visible. From a logical 
standpoint then, it seems more rational, if the aim is to gain influence in return, to 
rather focus on fewer but bigger ‘troop contributions’. According   to Johansen et 
al. (2007: 29-30) contributions are normally regarded as substantial when they 
consist of either a battalion of ca. 400 personnel (the army)9; one or more maritime 
vessels; one squadron of fighter planes (air-based operations)10; rapid reaction force 
contributions or when the operation inherits high levels of risk. Although this 
estimation is based on the norm in NATO, it is still deemed a valuable indication 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9 Reduced number of personnel may not necessarily challenge the efficiency of the contribution if this reduction 
is compensated for by material capabilities (Johansen et al. 2007:29).  
10 A squadron of fighter planes is often in the form of cooperation among several states.  
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of what constitutes a sizeable contributions– also within the framework of other 
organizations. In this regard, one example of a sizeable contribution (thus deemed 
substantial) may therefore be the Norwegian contribution to the Swedish-led Nordic 
EUBG. Here, Norway on two occasions contributed with about 100-150 special 
forces personnel on stand-by (MFA 2012#2), which is still deemed substantial as 
fewer high quality personnel corresponds to that of more lower quality personnel. 
As with size, the duration of a contribution is also closely linked to the resources 
of the ‘troop-contributing’ state, and the question of whether it is sustainable to 
contribute with few long-term contributions, or many with a short duration 
(Johansen et al. 2007:17). This is first and foremost related to the logistical 
challenges of maintaining a continuous contribution for long periods of time. 
Norway at least has a rotational system for personnel deployment, varying from for 
instance deployment abroad for periods of 6 months every 2,5 years or down to 
three weeks at the time (Ibid.:30). However, assessing the importance of the 
contribution’s duration in our case might prove difficult without comparing it to 
shorter or longer similar contributions – which is outside the scope of this thesis. 
Still, it depends of the eyes of the beholder. Compared to the still ongoing 
Norwegian contribution to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (from 2003 an 
onwards) Libya is deemed a contribution of short duration, beginning on March 24 
and ending on August 1, 2011 (Norwegian Armed Forces 2012). However, 
Johansen et al. (2007:44) assume that the visibility of an operation will decrease as 
it goes on. How fast this happens depend on the size and political importance of the 
operation. Yet it indicates that operations of a long duration whose visibility is 
rapidly decreasing, might not be regarded a substantial ‘troop contribution’. 
3.2.3 Risk 
The fourth aspect to take into consideration is how big of a risk a state is willing to 
take. Here, risk has both a political and humanitarian element. The latter is the 
primary concern in a operation, referring to the risk of jeopardizing and loosing 
lives, which depends on the intensity of the operation, the levels of threat for 
Norwegian forces and the likelihood that other parties may be harmed (Johansen et 
al. 2007: footnote 4). As you put national personnel at risk, that risk needs to be 
justified at the political level. The political risk is thus closely related to the possible 
loss of lives and other damages which may cause serious challenges with domestic 
public opinion (Johansen et al. 2007:24-5).  
The risk-aspect is also touched-upon by other scholars – inter alia claiming that 
contributions to ‘sharp operations’ have a higher value and is more appreciated 
(Græger 2005:90; Howorth 2006; Rickli 2008:316). According to Johansen et al. 
(2007:4,24,31) participation where there is risk involved can lead to a considerable 
return in terms of increased recognition and influence among allies, as the state 
would exhibit a willingness to  join in and share the heaviest loads and burdens. 
The argument here is that by taking a bigger part of the burden-sharing, the visibility 
of Norwegian participation increases, which might come with increased prestige or 
recognition. 
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3.2.4 Capabilities and Structural Elements 
Last, but not least, the final operational assessment aspect is that of capabilities and 
structural elements. Somewhat related to what has been mentioned on the size and 
risk of an operation, the question of capabilities and structural elements are linked 
to the type of operation one is participating in (Johansen et al. 2007:32). For 
instance there might be a difference between peace-keeping and peace-making 
operations, as well as between the different frameworks for the operation (NATO, 
EU, UN), where peacemaking operations and NATO-led missions are usually 
requiring heavier structural elements. Moreover, the question of which capabilities 
are needed in the operation will depend on where it unfolds: at sea, in the air, or on 
land, as well as on the structural elements. 
What is meant with structural elements is for example the reaction time of the 
contribution (how fast personnel is ready to be deployed, as well as how fast they 
are deployed); heavy vs. light forces (i.e. forces with a higher impact that can be 
used in high-intensity battle, as opposed to low-intensity situations, such as the 
difference between a warships or fighter planes vs. light infantry or transport 
helicopters)11; and material intensity (i.e. while army forces usually are personnel 
intensive, air and maritime forces usually have a higher material intensity. Higher 
material intensity is also linked to higher impact) (Johansen et al.2007:32).  
3.2.5 Substantial ‘Troop Contributions’ 
As has already been hinted at: substantial ‘troop contributions’ are perhaps first and 
foremost linked to the visibility of the operation to which a state contributes. This 
is in turn not only connected to size, but also to whether the ‘troop-contribution’ in 
question has a quick reaction time (deployability), high-intensity, or involves a high 
risk (Johansen et al. 2007:29). For instance, ‘sharp operations’ as referred to by 
Græger (2005), Howorth (2006) and Rickli (2008) is here understood as high-
intensity operations requiring heavier forces, and/or operations where a high risk is 
present. This is a relevant notion, as Græger (2005) more specifically points out 
“relevant force contributions, especially to ‘sharp’ military operations, is [in the 
dominant reading of Norwegian security and defense discourse] depicted as a way 
to grant Norway access to allied decision makers and for Norway’s voice to be 
heard on the international arena” (2005:90). Græger (forthcoming) also points to 
the importance of deployability for ‘troop-contributions’ to be relevant. 
Furthermore, it is not believed that the framework and type of an operation in 
itself determines whether a substantial ‘troop contribution’ is likely or not. As such, 
a substantial ‘troop-contribution’ could be made to either of the security and 
defense structures. This is in light of the fact that even peacekeeping operations 
under the UN umbrella, stabilizing a region, might involve high levels of risk even 
though it is not deemed a high intensity operation with heavy structural elements as 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 Again, this is linked to the risk of the operation, as for instance high-intensity battle is usually perceieved as 
more risky. 
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such (Johansen et al. 2007:31) – UN personnel may for instance still be under 
attack. Neither is it believed that it is necessary to distinguish between small and 
big states’ ‘troop contributions’. Although, one cannot deny that the notion of a 
state’s size and resources may matter in determining how capable it is of 
contributing with troops in the first place, small states are considered capable of 
making substantial ‘troop contributions as well. Lee-Ohlsson (2009:136) for 
instance argue that even small states can wield influence much beyond their size if 
they contribute with personnel to CSDP-operations and with ideas to the policy-
process. Another example might be that while Norway may not able to send infantry 
troops in the same numbers as the US, Norway has developed niche capabilities and 
inter alia holds 52 F-16 fighter planes – which have been essential enablers for 
recognition (Græger forthcoming). Thus, these resources and capabilities can give 
a higher visibility, and therefore still count as substantial when applied in 
international military operations. 
To sum up: for the purposes of this thesis, ‘troop-contributions’ are considered 
substantial when they are sizeable, capable, and/or easily deployable – preferably 
where high levels of risk are involved. 
3.3 Defining ‘Troops’ 
In light of what has been discussed in the section above, a definition of ‘troops’ as 
a component in the assumption of ‘troops for influence’, can be summed up as: 
Sizeable, capable, and/or deployable state contributions of military personnel 
and/or arms and equipment to international military operations within the 
framework of an international security and defense structure. 
 
Hence, ‘substantial troop-contributions’ constitutes the first conceptual 
building-block in this thesis. In line with the definition, the contribution of for 
instance one or more staff officers or military officials to the operational 
headquarter of an operation will not be considered a substantial ‘troop 
contribution’. In the continuation of this thesis, the entire definition will not be 
repeatedly referred to word by word, as it is too much of a mouthful. Instead, 
respectively ‘troop-contributions’ and ‘troop-contributing (third) state’ will be 
applied for references to the actual contribution as well as the state granting it.  
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4 Deconstructing the Assumption: 
‘Influence’ 
As exemplified in analytical language in the introduction to the previous chapter, 
‘influence’: the second component of our assumption, would constitute the potential 
effect ‘Y’, stemming from the potential cause ‘X’: ‘troops’. But how can we define 
‘influence’? Even without recourse to the assumption of ‘troops for influence’, 
there seems to be no clarity or consensus among scholars when it comes to an 
explicit definition of the concept of ‘influence’ in general, nor that of ‘political 
influence’. In particular, the much debated link between ‘influence’ and ‘power’ – 
to some extent or another – further enhance confusion in the literature (Zimmerling 
2005:4).  
Thus, it is first deemed necessary with a short discussion on the ‘power’-
‘influence’ debate, which will be handled in the first section, followed by the a 
definition of ‘influence’ in section two. Thereinafter, the third section is divided 
into four sub-sections of its own, in general dealing with the different kinds, levels 
and relationships connected with ‘influence’. Here, the first two sub-sections 
address the basic understanding and nature of our definition of ‘influence’ as an 
unwavering starting-point. More specifically, who is influencing whom and what 
will be discussed. The next two sub-sections will on the other hand deal with the 
possible variations in ‘influence’. this is both in terms of the levels at which it might 
occur against the backdrop of a ‘troop-contribution’, but also what types of 
‘influence’ there is. These variations will hence constitute the conceptual building-
blocks stemming from ‘influence’. All the while however, the fundamental 
definition of ‘influence’ stand fast. Finally, the last section will embark on how we 
can find indicators of ‘influence’ in the empirical material. Throughout the chapter, 
the existing literature and research on ‘influence’ as well as on Norwegian 
international participation within security and defense, will serve as a basis for 
inspiration and guidance. 
4.1 The ‘Power’ and ‘Influence’- Debate 
The inconsistent use, insufficient refinements, vagueness and ambiguity of both 
‘influence’ and ‘power’– with regard to whether they should be treated as 
interchangeable (like Dahl 1957 and Rothgeb 1992) or distinguished concepts 
(Lasswell & Kaplan 1950; Parsons 1963; Lukes 1974; Mokken & Stokman 1975) 
– is according to Zimmerling (2005) the most widely diffused problem with 
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‘influence’ in political science. This section will touch upon this debate, and 
motivate which stance this thesis will take.  
On the one hand, ‘influence’ and ‘power’ within political science apparently 
mean different things to many practitioners (Zimmerling 2005:2).12  According to 
Zimmerling (2005:100—104), one way to approach the distinction is by conceptual 
subordination, regarding one concept as a sub-category of the other. One example 
may be Lasswell and Kaplan (1950:74-6) who perceive ‘power ’as a special case 
of ‘influence’. Others view ‘power’ and ‘influence’ as complementary concepts, 
such as Mokken & Stokman (1975:37-46) who define both concepts as abilities, 
but claim that they derive from different sources and achieve different things. 
Moreover, the concepts can also be distinguished depending on means, such as 
sanctions (Lasswell & Kaplan 1950), persuasion (Etzioni 1993) or normativity 
(Pörn 1970); mode (Cassinelli 1966);  or with a focus on the type of change that 
happens, such as effects on interests (Lukes 1974) or on alternatives vs. actions 
(Mokken & Stokman 1975). 
On the other hand, however, and resembling the reasoning of Dahl (1957) and 
Rothgeb (1992) who argue for the interchangeable application of the two terms, the 
abovementioned ‘features’ are not deemed an exclusive property of either term in 
this thesis. It is rather the author’s opinion that ‘influence’ can incorporate or inherit 
them all, and that for instance normativity is not confined to one or the other, or that 
sanctions or persuasion is only characteristic of either or. Moreover, the author 
furthermore disagrees with the notion that one concept weighs heavier than the 
other, or that they necessarily have different sources and outcomes – i.e. the claimed 
difference in their relative importance and respective scope. Hence, while agreeing 
to, and being aware of the fact that, ‘influence’ and ‘power’ should not be seen as 
synonyms as a general rule or in every situation (for instance when referring to the 
USA as a military power), it is believed that ‘power’ would share the same meaning 
as ‘influence’ for the purposes of this thesis. Thus, lacking a reason to distinguish 
the terms, it is believed that the two terms can be applied interchangeably – a choice 
also Zimmerling accepts, as long it is explicitly acknowledged and argued for 
(2005:5,100). 
That said, even though the author of this thesis discards any claim for a 
distinction, the general debate and literature nevertheless offer valuable insight into 
the various nuances of ‘influence’ – irrespective of the fact that ‘influence’ in this 
thesis equals that of ‘power’ or not, or whether a distinction is made in the literature. 
In particular, it is deemed that Mokken & Stokman (1975) offer a valuable 
contribution to the overall discussion of ‘influence’ in this chapter by highlighting 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
12 In her Influence and Power: Variations on a Messy Theme from 2005, Ruth Zimmerling contributes to the 
conceptual debate on ‘influence’ and ‘power’ by first and foremost discussing the two concepts in a structured 
manner, creating some kind of overview. In particular, she allocates considerable space for the distinction she 
deems necessary between the two concepts. Thus, Zimmerling presents what can be called a typology of such a 
distinction with two main categories: conceptual subordination and complementarity. Additional features included 
are mode (possession/ability vs. exercise), as well as the type of means (sanctions, persuasion, and normativity), 
as well as change induced (intended vs. unintended change, effect on interests, alternatives vs. actions, and effect 
on freedom) (2005:104). 
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certain circumstantial aspects of possible importance for the up-coming definition 
and operationalization of ‘influence’, which will be handled later. 
 Having made clear that for the purposes of this thesis a distinction between 
‘power’ and ‘influence’ is deemed unnecessary, a definition of ‘influence’ will now 
be sought. In the existing literature on international operations, the references to 
‘influence’ is either lacking an explicit definition, or suffering from vague 
indications based on diffuse and unclear terms, such as ‘importance’ (Simon 2005), 
‘positive effects’ and ‘image’ (Johansen et al. 2007:11), ‘political returns’ and 
‘status’ (Kjølberg & Nyhamar 2011:25), or ‘prestige’ (Velazquez (2010). 
Remembering the purpose of this thesis,13 but at the same time honoring the 
feasibility of the study, a practical and observable definition of ‘influence’ will be 
pursued, in which it is possible to indicate ‘influence’ within the scope and time-
limits of the thesis.  
4.2 Defining ‘Influence’ 
In light of what is said above, Robert A. Dahl’s (1957) much cited definition of 
‘power’ (Singer 1963, in Rosenau 1969:381) is an example in which ‘power’ and 
‘influence’ are used indiscriminately and more or less synonymously (Mokken & 
Stokman 1975:36). As such, it will serve as a starting-point for the definition of 
‘influence’ sought in this thesis. In his book The Concept of Power from 1957, Dahl 
states that “A has power [thus influence] over B to the extent that he can get B to 
do something that B would not otherwise do” (1957:202-203). This is a general and 
quite broad definition – also leaving room for interpretation and maneuver. 
Therefore, further inspiration for a definition will primarily be drawn from Robert 
A. Cialdini’s (2009) work on how ‘influence’ works in practice, in which he focuses 
on how and why people comply with others’ requests. Although not explicitly 
defined in his textbook, it seems like Cialdini (2009) would state that ‘A has 
influence over B, if A can get B to comply with A’s request’. Hence, arguably 
building on Dahl, yet focusing on compliance with requests, one can narrow down 
that “‘something’ […] B would not otherwise do” to a more concrete and 
measureable action. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, the following definition 
will be applied: 
“Influence is the ability of an actor A to get another actor B to comply with 
A’s request”. 
 
Here, ‘ability’ can be understood both as a potential and actual exercise of 
‘influence’. Moreover, ‘influence’ is here referred to as a more general term, 
without explicitly defining or adding whether it is ‘political’ or ‘military’ in nature. 
However, both aspects will be dealt with in the following sections. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13 There are various possible ways of defining ‘influence’ as well as nuances of how we can understand it. 
However, it is deemed necessary to choose only one definition in order to make the study more feasible.  
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4.3 Understanding ‘Influence’: Relationships, Levels 
and Types 
Having come up with a general definition of ‘influence’, we first turn to how we 
can understand the basic elements of our definition: the actors, as well as the object 
of ‘influence’. In other words, the question of who has got ‘influence’ over whom, 
and what, will be addressed on the first two sub-sections. 
In the continuation, variances in ‘influence’ will be presented and discussed. 
First of all, the different levels of ‘influence’ in the decision-making process are 
connected to the ‘influence-position’ of actor A within the security and defense 
structure to which it contributes with troops. According to Mokken & Stokman 
(1975:50) such ‘influence-positions’ can be indicated through “critical positions in 
interaction and communication networks.” When applied to our case of 
international military operations, this relates to access to decision-making both at 
the military and political level. As such, these levels need to be addressed. This will 
in turn be followed by the different types of ‘influence’, such as formal vs. informal 
‘influence’, as these inter alia mirror the decision-making power of actor A at the 
different levels. Perhaps most importantly, the conceptual building-blocks for the 
purpose of this thesis will derive from the different levels and types of ‘influence’ 
discussed in their respective sub-sections. 
4.3.1 The So-Called ‘Influence-Relationship’: Who is Influencing 
Whom? 
‘Influence’ will in this thesis be regarded as a relationship between a pair of actors:  
A and B. For Dahl (1957), these actors can constitute both persons, groups, 
institutions, governments etc. In determining this for the purposes of this thesis, two 
general remarks are kept in mind. Most importantly, we first remember that this 
thesis mainly focuses on third-state troop-contributions to international military 
operations, and that the decision-making authority in international security and 
defense structures such as NATO, the UN, or even Coalitions of the willing lies 
with the states. Second, even though for instance the CSDP has maintained its 
intergovernmental nature post-Lisbon (Juncos & Pomorska 2011), there are still 
bodies, offices and institutions within the EU-organization that deals with matters 
of security and defense (Giegerich & Wallace 2010), such as the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), the Council Secretariat, or a Directorate General.14 Thus, 
it would be feasible to believe that the EU or other security and defense structures 
could constitute an ‘influence’-subject, represented by their bodies and offices. As 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
14 For instance, the Commission’s Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX). 
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such, in light of these institutional considerations, this thesis will view both states 
and security and defense structures, like the EU, as actors for the purposes of this 
thesis. The state-actors are represented both by the third-state that contributes with 
‘troops’, but also individual Member States of the security and defense structure in 
question. For simplicity purposes however, as the “test-case” later in the study will 
be applied on the Norwegian ‘troop-contribution’ to an EU-led operation, we from 
now on mainly focus on the EU in our deliberations and discussions. This 
furthermore helps strengthening the red thread of the thesis. 
Moreover, national officials and representatives are seen as extensions of their 
national governments, hence states, as they are responsible for enacting national 
policies at the international arena (Stern 1995, in Fermann 2007:32). Likewise, EU 
bodies and offices would in turn be extended by their officials and civil servants. 
Finally, the ‘troop-contributing third-state’ would here constitute the ‘influence- 
holder’, whereas the individual Member States and the EU constitute the ‘influence-
subjects’. 
Thus, the actors relevant for this study are: 
A = ‘troop-contributing’ third-state 
B1 = ‘individual Member-States’ 
B2 = ‘The EU’ 
 
It is therefore expected that a ‘troop-contributing third-state potentially could 
have ‘influence’ over an individual Member State, and/or the EU. 
 
Bilateral vs. multilateral ‘Influence relationships’ 
One can also find suggestions in the literature that it is possible to distinguish 
between gaining influence at bilateral and multilateral level (i.e. through bilateral 
relationships with an individual state or partner, as well as within a multilateral 
organization). For instance, Simon (2005) claims that NATO – in addition to 
providing a collective security guarantee – also represents an opportunity for small 
states to influence the USA. This is a view that Græger (2005:94,101) would agree 
to, as she claims that a Norwegian ‘troops for influence’-strategy has paid off vis-
à-vis the US and NATO, thereby indicating both a bilateral- and multilateral 
‘influence relationship’. Moreover, although both Simon (2005) and Græger (2005) 
refer to NATO in this regard, it is not unlikely that it may apply to the CSDP as 
well, and that both bilateral and multilateral ‘influence relationships’ can be formed 
and exist in all international security and defense structures. However, due to the 
time and scope limits of this thesis, the distinction between these two will in our 
case constitute the following:  
A ‘bilateral influence relationship’ is present if an individual Member State (B1) 
comply with the request of the ‘troop-contributing’ third-state (A); whereas 
A multilateral ‘influence relationship’ is deemed present if the EU (B2) complies 
with the request of the ‘troop-contributing’ third-state (A). 
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Here it is important to remember that B2 – the EU, could also be any other 
international security and defense organization or structure, such as NATO or the 
UN. Furthermore, notice will not be given to whether these relationships happen 
outside the scope of the structure representing the framework for the given 
operation,15 as it would rather be taken for granted that such relationships would be 
materialized within the framework of that said structure. 
4.3.2  ‘Influence’ Over What? 
According to Lukes (2005:18), Dahl’s view – and thus by extension the chosen 
definition in this thesis – is constrained to observable behavior in conflict-
situations, namely that the exercise of influence results in a change in actions when 
there is some form of opposition. Although Lukes performs this statement as a 
criticism, it points out important elements in our definition that needs further 
clarification and motivation, such as what the object and circumstances of 
‘influence’ are. 
On Behavior vs. Thoughts, and the Notion of Conflict 
Contrary to what is inherent in our definition, there are those who define ‘power’ 
in what could be called more abstract terms (i.e. highlighting the less visible 
dimensions contrary to what is observable). While Lukes (1974, 2005) focus on 
interests,16 others understand ‘influence’ as an effect on inter alia beliefs 
(Zimmerling 2005:141);17 attitudes and opinions (Parsons 1967:38);18 or both 
action, thought, and feelings (Banfield 1961).19 
However, the chosen definition in this thesis rather implies another view. 
Drawing on Zimmerling (2005:142) one could argue that there is a direct 
conceptual link – though not causal – between ‘influence’-holders’ (A) will and an 
‘influence’-subject’s (B) actions. Thus, it also fits with Dahl’s (1957) emphasis on 
behavior, rather than something more abstract. To illustrate this more clearly: if you 
have a request for something, there is something that you would like to achieve 
(will) and get someone else to help you with or do (action). As such, while 
acknowledging that ‘influence’ may have an effect on interests, preferences or 
beliefs, compliance with a request rather constitutes an observable action, in which 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
15 For instance, attention will not be given to whether for example France becomes more willing to comply to 
Norway’s requests in other issue areas as well and in other international organizations such as NATO or the UN. 
16 Lukes (1974,2005): “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests” (1974:34; 
2005:37). At first sight it looks rather similar to our definition as it apparently also include an aspect of conflict, 
although it points to a change in thought or preferences (rather than a change in behavior). 
17 According to Zimmerling, ‘social influence’ is “the ability’ to affect others’ beliefs, that is, their knowledge or 
opinions about what is or about what ought to be the case, about what is (empirically) true or false or what is 
(normatively) right or wrong, good or bad, desirable or undesirable” (2005:141). 
18 “Influence is a way of having an effect on the attitudes and opinions of others through intentional (though not 
necessarily rational) action – the effect may or may not be to change the opinion or to prevent a possible change” 
(Parsons 1967:38). 
19 Banfield (1961) make a broader understanding of it, incorporating the effect on both action, thought and feelings 
claiming that “[influence is] the ability to get others to act, think, or feel as one intends” (1961:3). 
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the preference or interest of actor B does not matter in the end. All that counts, is 
whether or not actor A gets what it requested, and does not have to be contrary to 
someone’s interests, preferences, or feelings, nor change them. 
Moreover, the request can logically cover a broad range of issues, favors, and 
services, but the essential element is that B’s actions conform to what A wants and 
requests. Yet, a request in our case is not understood as demanding compliance by 
the use of threat, but rather as asking for a favor or service without coercively 
requiring someone to comply. This is in particular related to the fact that third-states 
do not have any formal decision-making power outside the scope of their 
contribution (Knutsen 2010), and therefore cannot pressure other Member States 
by virtue of a veto. For instance, Norway’s policy towards the CSDP in general has 
moved away from a policy of demands vis-à-vis the EU, demanding inter alia 
formal arrangements for inclusion and insight, to one of contribution and 
cooperation (Græger 2002). Like one says: you reap what you sow. Thus from a 
logical standpoint it appears unlikely that Norway or other third-states would go to 
far ends in demanding insight and inclusion, and instead more likely that they would 
turn to (comparatively) humble requests respecting the fact that they are not a 
formal member. 
Still, it could be argued that decision-making in general constitute a web of 
conflicting views and preferences, thereby incorporating the element of opposition. 
However, even though B complies with A’s request, it is not implied or required 
that B necessarily must be opposed to A’s request in order for ‘influence’ to happen 
– thus discarding Dahl’s (1957) view that ‘influence’ necessarily happens in 
situations where there is some form of opposition. 
Finally, there is the notion of whether the change induced from the exercise of 
‘influence’ was intentional or unintended (Zimmerling 1991, in Zimmerling 
2005:104). Although this aspect also relates to the type of ‘influence’ which will be 
handled shortly, it will be addressed here as it is inherent in the fundamental 
understanding of our definition. Since we understand ‘influence’ in terms of 
compliance with a request, and remember Zimmerling’s (2005) emphasis on a 
conceptual link between the will of the influence’-holder and the ‘influence’-
subject’s actions, it seems rational to regard compliance with this request as an 
intended effect. Simply put: if you ask or request something, then there is something 
you would like to happen. 
Having decided on the fundamental understanding of ‘influence’ as our point of 
departure, the following sections will address possible variations in ‘influence’ for 
the purposes of this thesis. As the chosen definition of ‘influence’ is quite general 
and open for interpretation, we need to break down what kind of ‘influence’ are we 
talking about, and how can we relate this to the respective levels of the decision-
making process. Thus, both the different levels and types of ‘influence’ will now 
be presented and discussed in turn. 
  
  23 
 
4.3.3 The Different Levels of ‘Influence’ 
Although Mokken & Stokman distinguish between ‘power’ and ‘influence’, they 
still make a valid point with regard to the reach of ‘influence’ when transferred to 
our case. For instance, Mokken & Stokman (1975:37,46) hold that ‘power’ is the 
ability to determine which choices are available (alternatives), whereas ‘influence’ 
is the ability to determine the chosen option out of the available alternatives (the 
outcome/action). Reiterating that this thesis would on the contrary understand 
‘influence’ as possibly having an effect on both alternatives and actions as the two 
terms are seen as interchangeable, Mokken & Stokman still manage to highlight 
that ‘influence’ can be exercised both in the decision-shaping phase – initiating and 
formulating legislation, as well as in decision-making – making actual decisions, 
and implementation. In other words, it is believed that a troop-contributing state 
could have ‘influence’ at either time in the decision-making process.  
But how can we distinguish the different levels of ‘influence’? As a staring-
point, we again turn to Mokken & Stokman (1975:48), who simply view ‘influence’ 
as political when it occurs in the political sphere. Further interpreted this means that 
‘influence’ is military when it occurs at the military arena. Applying this simple 
logic to our case in the forthcoming analysis, we can maintain the general definition 
of ‘influence’ while at the same time indicate at what level it operates. Yet, this 
must be specified further with respect to the decision-making procedures within the 
framework of the security and defense structure to which a state is contributing with 
‘troops’. 
Broadly speaking, in international security and defense structures such as the 
CSDP and NATO, only Member States have formal access to the decision-shaping 
and making concerning the individual operations and the more general conceptual 
developments within the organization (Giegerich & Wallace 2010; NATO 2010). 
Third states in the CSDP and partner countries in NATO respectively only have 
formal access to the implementation phase of the operation to which they contribute 
through inter alia their participation in the Committee of Contributors. In other 
words, non-members can take part in the daily running of the operation, but not the 
day-to-day decision-making within the organization (Tardy 2013). Still, although 
third-states do not have formal access to all phases, both the military and political 
level will be incorporated into the analysis in order to highlight the differentiation 
between them. 
 
Political Level 
‘Influence’ at the political level, hence what will broadly be termed ‘political 
influence’, is when ‘B complies with A’s request during the political phase of the 
decision-making process’. For structural purposes, ‘political influence’ will be 
categorized according to “the hierarchy” of decision-making, namely strategic and 
operational ‘influence’. Here, ‘strategic influence’ would relate to both the strategic 
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guidelines of the policy, as well as to the day-to-day decision-making in for instance 
the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) or North Atlantic Council (NAC) in connection 
with security and defense issues, and therefore be linked to the decision-shaping 
and making phases. It is also in these phases where the decisions establishing and 
creating the framework for an operation are made (Framework Agreement 2004). 
In short: A will have ‘political strategic influence’ when B complies with A’s 
request relating to the general strategic and conceptual development of the 
organization’s security and defense related policies. ‘Operational political 
influence’ would in turn concern the political decisions on the operational aspects 
of the operations, such as identifying political objectives for the operation, and thus 
be directly linked to the specific operations and the implementation phase at 
political level. Thus, A will have ‘political operational influence’ if B complies with 
A’s request relating to the operational daily running of the operation, such as for 
instance having a say on decisions concerning further planning and development of 
the operations when issues arise. 
  
Military Level 
‘Influence’ at the military level, and accordingly what will broadly be called 
‘military influence’, would be when ‘B complies with A’s request during the 
military phase of the decision-making process. In other words, this regards the 
execution and implementation phase of an operation where the military tactical and 
operational decisions are made. ‘Operational’ here means converting the 
overreaching political goals to concrete military action: identifying means to gain 
an effect, thus constituting the link between the political level and the tactical level 
(Henriksen 2013:34). As such, A will have ‘military operational influence’ if B 
complies with A’s request relating to the operational aspects of the operation, which 
is normally handled from the Operation’s headquarter. This could for instance relate 
to discussion on how to define protection of civilians. Moreover, A will have 
‘military tactical influence’ if B complies with A’s request relating to daily tactical 
decisions at place where the operation is carried out, for instance requesting to take 
on a particular assignment, or refusing to do so. 
4.3.4 The Different Types of ‘Influence’ 
Having identified the different levels of ‘influence’, the possible variations in 
‘influence’-types will now be presented and discussed. Whereas formal and 
informal ‘influence’ is linked to the variance formal decision-making power of the 
‘troop-contributing’ third-state at the different levels of the decision-making 
process, actual and potential ‘influence’ is linked to the difference in the 
‘influence’-holder’s will to affect the ‘influence’-subject’s actions. 
Formal vs. Informal ‘Influence 
Remembering the different levels of ‘influence’ and phases in the decision-making 
process, one can also distinguish between formal and informal ‘influence’ in light 
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of the difference in formal and informal decision-making power of the troop-
contributing country. In the capacity of being a ‘troop-contributor’ and irrespective 
of membership, even ‘troop contributing’ third-states at least have ‘formal 
influence’ in the implementation phase of an operation.20 In other words, third-
states on paper have the possibility of political operational-, and military 
operational and tactical ‘influence’. ‘Influence’ in these stages could then be termed 
‘formal influence.’ 
However, as ‘troop-contributing’ third-states do not have formal access and 
information during the other phases of the decision-making process (Tardy 2014), 
they might try to affect these phases of the decision-making process through 
informal channels. ‘Informal channels’ here refers to interaction with decision-
makers and bureaucrats happening outside the scope of the formal, institutionalized 
meeting-arenas within security and defense where formal decisions are taken. In 
fact, according to Peterson et al. (2012:307), the most active lobbyists within the 
CFSP in general are actually third-state governments. Moreover, this third-state 
‘diplomatic lobbying’ efforts would be seen as ‘informal influence’ if it would lead 
a Member State or EU institution to comply with one’s request related to decision-
shaping or making phases. ‘Informal influence’ is thus understood as B complying 
with A’s request in situations where A itself do not have a formal seat at the table.  
Potential vs. Actual ‘Influence’ 
The other type of ‘influence’ that needs to be addressed is whether or not ‘influence’ 
is to be regarded as a potential or an actual ability that is exercised (Singer 1963, in 
Rosenau 1969; Østerud 2007). As Mokken & Stokman (1975:46) states, the 
capacity to influence must be distinguished from its actual application: the influence 
behavior. As already mentioned, our definition of ‘influence’ as the “ability of an 
actor A to get another actor B to comply with A’s request” can refer both to the 
‘potential influence of actor A’, as well as ‘actor A’s actual influence’. More 
specifically, ‘potential influence’ can be understood as a yet unrealized opportunity, 
where ‘B is willing to comply with A’s request, but has not yet been subject to such 
a request’. ‘Actual influence’ is in turn when B has complied with A’s request. 
To take an example: both Græger (forthcoming) and Henriksen (2013) hint at 
an unrealized influence-potential in relation to Norwegian contributions to 
respectively the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and in Libya,21 indicating a lack of 
willingness to take advantage of ‘potential influence’ and convert it into ‘actual 
influence’.22 Continuing this line of thought, while reiterating that according to our 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
20 See for instance the Framework Agreement, 2004 for further details. 
21 Norway contributed to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan –which 
is still ongoing (Norwegian Armed Forces 2012), and to the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in 
Libya from March 30 – August 1, 2011 (Norwegian Armed Forces 2013#1). For more information, see ISAF 
(2014). International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures, ISAF, April 1, 2014. 
[http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/2104-04-01%20isaf%20placemat-final.pdf]. 
22 Græger still claims that there has been some converted ‘influence’ stemming from Norwegian participation in 
Afghanistan: “(…) Norway’s military contributions [in Afghanistan] has paid off and been converted into 
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definition there is a conceptual link between A’s will and B’s actions, one could 
wonder what would be the case if A did not have the willingness to make B comply 
with its request. As such, we touch upon another conceptual building-block, namely 
that of the ‘troop-contributing’ state’s ‘willingness to exert influence’, which will 
be handled in more detail later. 
4.4 Indicators for Different Levels and Types of 
‘Influence’ 
So, how can we measure ‘influence’? The question of what is actually requested is 
noteworthy in this regard, as ‘A’s request’ can logically entail a variety of different 
issues, favors, and services. However, although the definition of ‘influence’ and our 
operationalization of its various levels and types is still quite broad, it is obviously 
not totally unrestricted. For instance, trivial and banal requests by a national 
representative from the ‘troop-contributing’ state, such as asking a Member State 
representative for a soda and getting one, will logically not be considered an act of 
‘influence’ on the part of former, and certainly not termed ‘political operational 
influence’ even though both parties are present in a meeting in the Committee of 
Contributors. Thus, this section discusses and reiterates how ‘influence’ will be 
measured for the purposes of this thesis, and in the same process touch more 
specifically upon what kind of requests could be expected.   
4.4.1 Indications of ‘Influence’ in Previous Literature 
In the existing literature on (Norwegian) troop-contributions – primarily within the 
context of NATO –‘influence’ is first and foremost indicated through tangible and 
observable incidents/criteria, or by reference to publicly assumed beliefs. For 
example, Græger (2005) states that in the dominant reading of Norwegian security 
and defense discourse, “relevant force contributions (…) is (…) depicted as a way 
to grant Norway access to allied decision makers and for Norway’s voice to be 
heard on the international arena” (2005:90) – both bilaterally and multilaterally. In 
a to-be published article, Græger (forthcoming) also hint to the appointment of 
nationals to central and influential positions in the operational framework of 
individual operations (planning and running of operations), in the permanent 
organizational setup in headquarters and command, as well as more generally 
within the NATO-structure, as valuable indications of ‘influence’. This is what 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
political influence” (2005:91), through inter alia the locating of the Joint Warfare Center in Norway at Jåttå 
(Ibid.:94). 
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Mokken & Stokman (1975) would call positions of influence.23 A more concrete 
example of a similar approach, is the recent appointment of Jens Stoltenberg – 
Former Prime Minister of Norway – as the new Secretary General of NATO, which 
according to Matlary (in Ertesvåg 2014) was directly linked to the considerable 
Norwegian military contribution under the intervention of Libya in 2011.24  
Still, while not contesting that these suggestions might add value to the 
understanding of the concept of ‘influence’ and the realization of the ‘troops for 
influence’- assumption, we have chosen a different approach in which a more 
precise materialization of various levels and kinds of ‘influence’ is measureable. 
Thus, according to our definition of ‘influence’, ‘getting its voice heard’ is more in 
line with what we are searching for, contrary to the appointment of formal positions 
within the EU structure which is constrained to the actual Member States (except 
possibly at the operational headquarter at Northwood where ‘troop-contributing’ 
third states may be present). However, Græger (2005) also makes an example which 
is more applicable to our case and operationalization, arguably hinting at NATO 
compliance with a request from the Norwegian government. More concretely put, 
she states that  
the leading interpretation was that the deployment of Norwegian troops to the US-led 
operations in Afghanistan did facilitate the government’s efforts to convince its NATO 
allies that the [Joint Warfare Center (JWC)] should be located in Norway [at Jåttå] 
(Græger 2005:91). 
 
Here, one could imagine that the Norwegian government made a request for the 
location of the JWC, which in turn was complied with as a result of Norwegian 
troop-contributions to the ISAF mission. However, is really appointments to central 
formal positions within the decision-making structure equal to or necessarily mean 
‘influence’? No, according to our definition it is not. However, although 
appointments of formal positions do not apply as indicators for our definition, the 
request for such appointments is however deemed feasible. It moreover points to 
an important element linked to ‘influence’, namely that of access. Thus, we are 
back to where we started: what kind of requests (and compliance thereto) could be 
made that might indicate ‘influence’ in our case? In order to carry this through in a 
structured manner, the following part will handle and reiterate how we can indicate 
the various forms of ‘influence’ in turn,. Moreover, in light of Græger’s (2005) 
emphasis on holding central positions inside security and defense structures, in 
combination with Mokken & Stokman’s (1975) claim that information and access 
are necessary conditions for ‘influence’, we will therefore briefly discuss the 
importance of information and access to decision-making for ‘influence’ in general. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
23 Positions of influence and power can be identified in the form of “critical positions in interaction and 
communication networks” (Mokken & Stokman 1975:50). 
24 Matlary holds that “it is obvious that USA looks at which countries that contribute with military capacities” 
when deciding which candidate to nominate and support (Matlary, cited in Ertesvåg 2014, (author’s own 
translation from Norwegian)). 
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4.4.2 The Role of Access and Information in Decision-Making 
When discussing what kinds of requests could be made, both information and 
access come across as essential suggestions. For third-states like Norway, the need 
for access and information cannot be downplayed. For instance, in the Norwegian 
case, good contact-arrangements (i.e. access) and cooperation with the EU in 
security and defense related issues are identified as important, both in order to 
contribute to EU-led operations, but also to get insight into these processes (i.e. 
information) (Europaportalen 2013). As already mentioned, for non-EU members 
the possibilities of actually getting access and information is however quite limited 
– at least through formal channels. Chalmers (2013:39) moreover claims that “[t]he 
currency of lobbying in the [EU] is information” (Chalmers 2013:39). Although 
this statements is primarily aimed at interest group activity and expertise towards 
EU decision-makers, it still highlights the importance of information as a resource 
and something that is appreciated. As formal Member States by virtue of their 
membership already have access to decision-making structures and information, 
this from a logical standpoint appears as something third-states would possibly 
request. Thus, yet again we lean on Mokken and Stokman (1975) who turn the 
spotlight on the role of access and information for political influence in decision-
making in general: 
 
[t]he exercise of influence takes place mainly by means of persuasion, information 
and advice. The most important, if not the only, source of influence is in particular 
associated with strategic locations in the communication and information networks 
that other actors use for the determination of their behavior (Mokken & Stokman 
1975:37). 
 
Hence, we can understand this along the lines of ‘a necessary condition for 
having or exerting ‘influence’ is first of all to have access to the decision-making 
process and information’. It therefore appears like access and information are both 
means that can be used to achieve ‘influence’ at the same time as they constitute 
conditions for it to happen in the first place. Moreover, Mokken & Stokman (1975) 
hold that 
 
[w]ell-aggregated and well-organized information can lead to influence only if the 
actors concerned have the capacity to introduce (or derive) their information in (or 
from) decision-making at the right times and in the right agencies (Mokken & 
Stokman 1975:50). 
 
 The information-flow, if we can call it that, can as such be argued to be a bi-
directional process, where a state may get ‘influence’ either by presenting 
information and getting it to the decision-makers (i.e. the other states) – from the 
outside to the inside of the lion’s den, or by receiving information from decision-
makers –from inside the walls to outside them. It is moreover emphasized that it 
needs to happen at the right point in time (here, understood as for example 
introducing information/proposals before the decisions are made), and in the right 
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forum (i.e. does not matter if you manage to get your information to the EP if it is 
the Council that is making the decision). However, in order both to supply and 
receive information, access to the relevant decision-makers or decision-making 
forums is necessary. 
Hence, in light of what has been presented and discussed above, we can draw 
the conclusion that requests for access and information per se – in particular for 
third states – may be expected, especially in the decision-shaping and making 
phases where they are formally excluded, in order to know what is going on. Sjursen 
(2008:323) hitherto confirms our theory by stating that Norwegian governments 
have systematically sought to gain the best possible access and insight into the EU’s 
CSFP in general. Thus, we do not expect it to be otherwise in this case. Actually, at 
least within the context of the NATO-led operation in Libya in 2011, it was quite 
natural that ‘troop-contributing’ states requested ‘influence’ at the operational level, 
that is: asking for a seat at the table (Coglitore 2012, in  Henriksen 2013:45). Worth 
mentioning, however, is that ‘formal influence’ (i.e. having a seat at the table) 
differs from ‘actual influence’. Still, if you get a seat at the table, you will get 
listened to and can exert ‘influence’ if you are competent (i.e. have information and 
knowledge) (Solem 2012, in Henriksen 2013:45). 
In addition, if granted access to for instance informal meetings with other 
Member States or EU-institutions, third states are offered an opportunity to at least 
present and view their own opinions and proposals, or even humbly request that 
these are taken into consideration or mirrored in later decisions.  
The following sub-section will summarize the indicators for the different levels 
and types of ‘influence’, which will constitute the conceptual building-blocks 
derived in this ‘influence’-chapter. 
4.4.3 Summarizing Indicators for ‘Influence’ 
For the purposes of this thesis we have said that first, “political strategic influence 
is when B complies with A’s request relating to the general strategic and conceptual 
development of the organization’s security and defense related policies.” As argued 
for in the previous section, indicators for ‘political strategic influence’ could be 
compliance with requests for meetings with national or EU officials and 
representatives, or for access to documents and other information concerning this 
stage of the decision-making process. It could moreover regard requests such as 
taking into consideration proposals or information from A to B. 
Second, “political operational influence is when B complies with A’s request 
relating to the operational (i.e. daily running) of the operation, primarily within the 
context of the Committee of Contributors”. As the decisions relating to the 
operation in question has already been made in the Council, and it is mainly a forum 
in which one discuss the developments of the operation, requests concerning the 
further planning and development, such as suggestions, could serve as indicators. 
Once again it is also likely that requests would concern access and information. 
Compliance to such requests are therefore seen as indicators for ‘political 
operational influence’. 
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Third, “military operational influence is when B complies with A’s request 
relating to the operational aspects of the operation”.  It is at this level, and within 
the context of the OHQ that decisions, discussions, and analyses on the use of 
military power is conducted. In particular it concerns converting political goals into 
military actions (Henriksen 2013:35). Indicators for ‘operational military influence’ 
would therefore be compliance with requests concerning questions such as whether 
or not one should use bombs, how to interpret the discourse in the decisions laying 
the foundation for the operation, or what it actually means to protect civilians. More 
specifically, it could be when B complies with A’s request concerning the 
nomination of a target in the targeting process. 
Forth, “military tactical influence is when if B complies with A’s request 
relating to daily tactical decisions at place where the operation is carried out.” It is 
at this level where the targets identified at the military operational level are 
conducted and implemented. It is moreover where the ‘troop contributing’ states 
discuss who is to take on the different assignments (i.e. “take out different targets”) 
(Henriksen 2013:35). For instance then, one possible indicator of ‘military tactical 
influence’ could be if B complied with A’s request of changing a target, or requests 
for assigning or abstaining certain assignments or tasks.25 
Finally, summing up all the different types of ‘influence’, we can simply state 
that if ‘influence’ can be indicated at one or more levels, whether it is informal or 
formal depends on the formal participatory rights (stemming from the ‘troop 
contribution’ itself) of the ‘troop contributing’ state at that level. The identified 
indicators and the operationalization made is mainly focusing on ‘actual influence’. 
Hence, ‘potential influence’ is deemed present if these situations or requests can be 
seen as unrealized potentials – that is, if B would have complied with A’s request – 
if requested. More specifically, an indicator for ‘potential influence’ may be if actor 
A is of the impression that if it was to request something in relation to actor B – B 
would be willing to comply. In other words: a perception that other Member States 
and the EU show a willingness to cooperate and that Norwegian inquiries are 
normally met. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
25 According to the then Minister of Defense, Norway in Libya 2011 had a say in the process of targeting and 
Norwegian personnel had “real national influence, […] demonstrated by a change of targets on certain 
occasions” (Faremo 2011). 
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5 Theorizing the Link between 
‘Troops’ and ‘Influence’ 
The two previous chapters have discussed different possible understandings and 
definitions of ‘troops’ and ‘influence’, thereby contributing to how we can view the 
assumption’s components overall and what is possibly meant when referred to 
them. Therefore, as we have already addressed the components individually, this 
chapter now moves on to how they might be connected. So why could we expect 
‘troop-contributions’ to leas to ‘influence’ in the first place? Perhaps even more 
interesting: if we assume there to be a link between the two components, how could 
this link look like and what factors may be at play? Is there a more complex web of 
relationships and connections? In addressing all these questions, the chapter is 
divided in two main sections, with their proper introductions and motivations of 
choice.  
5.1 Understanding Why ‘Troops’ Would Lead to 
‘Influence’? 
This first section will present possible ways to understand the link between ‘troops’ 
and ‘influence’ by relying on already existing theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks: a realist perspective, ‘influence theory’, and ‘logic of images’ – which 
are seen as complementary for this purpose. While the former focuses on military 
power (i.e. ‘troops’), Cialdini’s (2009) principles pay attention to how ‘influence’ 
works in practice (i.e. ‘influence’), and Jervis (1989) sheds light on the third aspect 
that has been indicated in previous chapters: that of images (i.e. ‘recognition’ and 
‘prestige’). Thus, they will provide possible and complementary approaches as to 
why one would expect troop contributions to lead to influence in the first place. 
Each approach will be addressed in turn, laying the foundation for the forthcoming 
section in this chapter. 
5.1.1 A Realist Perspective: A Military Power Focus 
Simply put and despite some variations, commonalities across the different realist 
traditions are inter alia that states are the key actors, and their most important 
instrument is military power and capabilities which can be used to  achieve the 
states’ primary goal: namely the search for power or security (Nye & Welch 
2011:56).  Thus, at first glance, the assumption of ‘troops for influence’ appear as 
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derived from the realist literature and fundamental thought. This is perhaps more 
clear when – having already systematically deconstructed the assumption and 
reviewed its components separately – we remember that ‘troops’ is understood as 
‘substantial arms and military personnel contributions’ (i.e. military capabilities), 
and that ‘influence’ in this thesis is deemed interchangeable with ‘power’. 
According to Morgenthau, “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for 
power” (Morgenthau [1948] 1993:29), where military strength is an obvious 
measure of a state’s power. The focus on power is in other words evident. In light 
of Morgenthau’s words, substantial ‘troop contributions’ should therefore be 
mirrored in a state’s ‘influence’ in decision-making. Furthermore, the use of 
military power itself to gain ‘influence’ [power] is simply a natural consequence of 
the system. 
But how would realists understand the potential link between ‘troops’ and 
‘influence’? Haugaard (2003:87-88) claims that those working within the realist 
tradition in international relations, primarily tend to view [influence] coercively, 
and that it is exercised through the threat or use of physical sanctions or 
inducements, punishment or reward. This would among others fit with the view of 
Morgenthau ([1948] 1993:30,31), who highlight the expectation of benefits and the 
fear of disadvantages as prime sources of power, in particular in international 
politics. To some extent, ‘troop contributions’ might therefore in realist terms be 
regarded as a physical inducement to security and defense-cooperation, which in 
turn might induce others to comply with the request of the ‘troop-contributing 
state’.  
Moreover, Art (1996:8) would argue that we could expect ‘troop-contributions’ 
to lead to ‘influence’ as military power is versatile as it is able to perform a variety 
of tasks and across different policy domains for both military and non-military 
purposes. In fact, using Art’s words, military power – as indicated through ‘troop-
contributions’ – could very well be converted to political influence in other policy-
domains through inter alia “artificial linkage-politics”, where national officials 
“bring about politically what is not produced functionally (…) [making] the best 
deals they can by compensating for weakness in one area with strength in others” 
(Art 1996:31-32). This could then very well translate to ‘troop-contributing’ third-
states in the CSDP, who might try to compensate for their weak position in the 
development of the EUs security and defense policy with a substantial contribution 
to an EU-led operation. Summing up, we can say in short that realists would hold 
that there is a link between ‘troop-contributions’ and ‘influence’ because it is 
military capabilities that determine influence in general. 
5.1.2 Cialdini’s (2009) ‘Principle of Reciprocation’: Focus on 
‘Influence’ 
So what would an ‘influence theory’ perspective say on why we could expect 
‘troop-contributions’ to lead to ‘influence’? One of the most prestigious scientists 
on ‘social influence’ is Robert B. Cialdini who is an expert in the fields of 
persuasion, compliance, and negotiation. In his textbook Influence: Science and 
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Practice, Cialdini (2009) identifies six principles of influence (or ‘weapons of 
influence’ as he calls them), based on studies on why people comply with requests 
in business and other settings; reciprocation, scarcity, authority, commitment and 
consistency, liking and social proof. In other words, Cialdini provides six means by 
which one can get someone else to comply with one’s request – thereby contributing 
to the understanding of how ‘influence’ works in practice and its underlying logic. 
Despite the fact that Cialdini’s work primarily address human behavior (i.e. 
individuals), adding to the fact that he mainly provide examples from business and 
sales situations,26 the underlying logic of ‘influence’ is still deemed valuable in the 
attempt to put more flesh on the assumption of ‘troops for influence’. However, 
only the ‘principle of reciprocation’ will be of any value here, as this is the only 
principle that can be directly linked to our case and because it is believed “superior” 
to the others. In fact, Cialdini (2009) himself claims that the power of this principle 
is so strong that it can overpower the effect of other factors that normally determine 
compliance with a request, such as ‘liking’ a person (Cialdini 2009:23). 
The ‘principle of reciprocation’ is according to Cialdini (2009) ‘the old give and 
take’, which simply says that we should try to repay, in kind, what someone else 
has provided us. By virtue of the reciprocity rule, we are therefore obligated to the 
future repayment of favors, gifts, invitations etc. (Cialdini 2009:19), allowing for 
“one individual to give something to another with confidence that it is not being 
lost” (Ibid:49). It does not matter whether we have asked for what we receive – we 
will still feel indebted even for an unintended favor (Ibid:31). In other words, by 
contributing with troops to international military operations, a ‘troop-contributing’ 
state could therefore expect something in return from the (other) Member States or 
the organizations’ institutions for its contributions. The underlying logic here, is 
that as the latter might feel indebted towards the ‘troop-contributing’ state, it is 
granted a certain influence, as they are more willing to give it something else in 
return for its contributions. Thus they might comply to the ‘troop-contributing’ 
state’s requests more readily than if a ‘troop-contribution’ had not been made. 
As already described in the chapter on ‘influence’’, Cialdini (2009) apparently 
shares a similar definition of ‘influence’ as this thesis, indicating that ‘A has 
influence over B, if A can get B to comply with A’s request’.  In order for B to do 
as A wants, A can thus rely on the means presented by Cialdini and put them 
actively to use. Cialdini might therefore also argue that ‘troop contributions’ is an 
intended act, scrumptiously planned for in order to get the receiver to feel like it has 
to comply with the ‘troop-contributor’s’ requests, out of a feeling of indebtedness. 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
26 Cialdini claims that the reciprocity rule also show itself at the political arena, and at every level of such. Worth 
mentioning is that by the political arena, Cialdini here refers to elected American officials and in particular uses 
the examples of lobbyism and interest group financial contributions to these officials (2009:26-28). However, this 
difference is believed not to matter in our case as what matters here is the general logic of how influence works. 
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5.1.3 Jervis’ (1989) ‘the Logic of Images’ 
 
Before we embark on the next theoretical perspective, it is necessary to give a brief 
additional motivation for why exactly this perspective is chosen. While the two 
former perspectives were deemed applicable to shed light on the imagined link as 
they each give considerable attention to one of the two components in our 
assumption, the following perspective is highlighted as it provides a theoretical 
backbone to yet another aspect that might be inherent in the relationship between 
‘troop-contributions’ and ‘influence’. As we say in the chapter on ‘troops’, scholars 
such as Kjølberg & Nyhamar (2011) and Græger (forthcoming) both point to 
another and more abstract feature in relation to ‘troop contributions’ – namely how 
a ‘troop-contributing’ state may be perceived by its partners following its 
contribution to an international military operation. Thus, the motive for applying 
the forthcoming ‘image’ perspective is the belief that we might possibly be able to 
derive some interesting indications from its reasoning. Hopefully, this will help to 
shed light on yet another ‘reward’ ensuing contributions – which furthermore, and 
as will be argued, is interlinked with our concept of ‘influence’ as well. 
In his The Logic of Images in International Relations from 1989, Robert Jervis 
address how an actor can affect “beliefs about himself and lead others to make 
predictions about his behavior that will contribute to his reaching his goals” 
(1989:3). ‘An image’ can here be understood as the beliefs that actor B has about 
actor A which will affect his predictions of how actor A will behave under various 
circumstances – thus the perception of actor A. As such, Jervis’ understanding of 
‘images’ can be somewhat linked to that of ‘reputation’, which in turn can be 
defined as “the beliefs or opinions that are generally held about someone or 
something” – typically linked to a particular characteristic (Oxford Dictionaries 
2014). However, ’reputation’ does not per definition necessarily include having a 
prediciton of how someone can be expected to behave in all situations. However, 
from a logial standpoint, if someone has a reputation of being cooperative and 
credible, others might be of the opinion that this someone can be trusted if they 
were to enter into an agreement together. Hence, the image of this actor is that it is 
a cooperative and credible partner. 
What Jervis (1989) holds more specifically, is that the image of a state – which 
is linked to inter alia good will and prestige – may be a major factor in determining 
if, and how easily, a state can reach its goals. In fact, in some circumstances a state 
may be willing to pay a high price or take risks to win a minor symbolic victory. In 
particular, Jervis (1989) points out that “if a state A can convince B of its good will, 
that is, of its friendly intentions towards B, B may be more willing to cooperate 
since it will not fear that A is trying to draw it into a trap (1989:7). In short, this can 
be shown both in words and through action. In achieving prestige and recognition 
in the first place, both Fermann (2007), Bátora (2013), and Græger (forthcoming:3) 
point out that military capabilities (.i.e. ‘troop-contributions’) may help serve as a 
strategic commodity to that end. 
Thus, how would Jervis, or the ‘logic of images’, explain why ‘troop-
contributions’ might lead to ‘influence’? It light of what is said above, it seems like 
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first, a state would contribute with ‘troop’s in order to get a symbolic gain: aka it 
adds to its image with prestige and recognition. Thus, upholding or gaining a 
particular image could serve as an objective for participation. Along similar lines, 
Nina Græger (forthcoming) explores how status is defined, sought and achieved 
through something she calls “[a] ‘forces-for-status’ policy”: seeking international 
status through military contributions to international operations (Græger 
forthcoming:2). Here, status is understood in terms of being regarded as a central 
or influential ally, and being perceived as a trustworthy and reliable partner to count 
on in strategic and operational matters. This is, in other words, something that may 
follow from ‘troop-contributions’. Thus, is appears like Græger goes in line with 
Jervis’ understanding of reputation and recognition – and hence image. 
Second, the ‘logic of images’ would probably hold that once a state has 
contributed with ‘troops’ to an international military operation, and therefrom 
gained status and/or improved or maintained its image as a cooperative partner that 
can be trusted, other Member States and for instance the EU would be more willing 
to cooperate. Hence, remembering our definition of ‘influence’, they might become 
more likely to comply with the requests of the ‘troop-contributing’ state as they 
perceive the latter as trustworthy and reliable. Finally, what is perhaps most 
interesting, is that in this reasoning it is indicated that ‘troop-contributions’ lead to 
an improved image, which in turn might lead to ‘influence’ – thus touching upon 
how this link may look like, which we will address in the up-coming section. 
 
5.2 Understanding How ‘Troops’ Might Lead To 
‘Influence’ 
Having slightly elaborated upon possible explanations as to why one would expect 
‘influence’ to stem from ‘troop-contributions’, it is time to investigate and 
understand how this relationship might actually look like. Although the aim is not 
to reveal or claim fully-fledged causal mechanisms and relationships, it is still 
deemed a valuable contribution to logically reflect on such relationships as a 
starting point for future studies. Here, the discussion will draw on what has already 
been mentioned in previous chapters, arguments in existing literature on ‘troop 
contributions’ and ‘military operations’, as well as theoretical contributions on the 
sources, means and conditions for ‘influence’. Moreover, the conceptual building-
blocks developed and presented earlier in the thesis will be brought back into 
attention. 
As we have seen, Mokken & Stokman (1975) point to the importance of 
information and access as necessary conditions or enablers for ‘influence’, while 
others have indicated that ‘troop-contributions’ may also come with prestige or 
recognition (Velazquez 2010; Kjølberg & Nyhamar 2011). Moreover, ‘willingness 
to exert influence’ might constitute yet another factor (Græger forthcoming). But 
what role may these factors play? Hence, we might therefore expect a more complex 
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web of relationships and connections than just simply a straightforward one-to-one 
link between ‘troops’ and ‘influence’. This section will therefore now embark on 
the exercise of trying to get an overview and a possible understanding of how these 
components are linked together by gathering the bits and pieces of, and building on, 
what has previously been discussed in this thesis, with additional help from the 
existing literature. Together, this will lay the tentative ground for the conceptual 
building-blocks for future theory-development on ‘troops for influence’.  In short: 
a possible understanding of how ‘troop-contributions’ lead to ‘influence’ will be 
sought. For this purpose, it is assumed as a starting-point that a substantial ‘troop-
contribution’ has already been made – which constitutes the first conceptual 
building-block. 
5.2.1 Access and Information Revisited 
It is important to have access to and influence in international forums where key 
decisions about peace, security and global affairs are made (Græger 
forthcoming:13), although it may not always be so easy to achieve, in particular for 
third-states (Rieker 2006). For Mokken & Stokman, influence in decision-making 
“is strongly associated with the effective aggregation and organization of 
information, intelligence and expertise and the availability of good opportunities 
for access to levels of decision-making” (1975:49). ‘Influence’ may thus arise on 
two grounds. First, it can happen through ‘privileged access’ to different decision-
making levels, authorities and policy-makers. However, this is also a question of 
participatory rights, and it is dependent on timing: access is not enough in itself, 
and effective information has to be channeled at the right time to the right people.27 
Second, ‘influence’ can arise through ‘privileged information’, which can be 
understood as the advantage of information, based on superior, efficient or timely 
knowledge, arguments and know-how. Yet again, the mere possession of such 
information is not sufficient to constitute ‘influence’, but is moreover dependent on 
organization and aggregation in addition to skills (Ibid. 50). Thus, the latter notion 
can be understood as competence, as highlighted by Solem 2012 (in Henriksen 
2013:45). 
So what indications can we possibly derive from the above mentioned in order 
to shed light on how our relationship may look like? In the chapter on ‘influence’ 
we determined that first, ‘information’ and ‘access’ constitute important conditions 
for ‘influence’. What is meant here is that ‘troop-contributions’ at least grant a 
‘troop-contributing’ state access and information within the implementation phase 
of the operation through the participation in inter alia the Committee of 
Contributors. This formal access to decision-making and information can 
thereinafter lead to ‘potential influence’ as the ‘troop-contributing’ state will inherit 
the conditions of exerting ‘influence’. However, in order for ‘potential influence’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
27 On information on windows of opportunity an dthe Multiple Streams Framework, please see Kingdon, J. 
(2011). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. (New York: Longman). 
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to lead to ‘actual influence’, competence is necessary in order to take advantage of 
this potential – thus, an intervening variable: ‘competence’. Hence, we might have 
to add another dimension to our understanding of ‘potential influence’, namely that 
it also constitutes having the conditions or tools necessary for exerting ‘influence’, 
in addition to the ‘influence-subject’ being open to comply with A’s request. 
Finally, we have also determined that information and access may be the 
substance of what is requested. Thus, if such request for access and information are 
complied with, access and information constitute a product or effect of ‘actual 
influence’. 
5.2.2 On the Notion of ‘Image’ 
First, it is important to underline that in the following part status, prestige, 
reputation, and recognition are seen as interchangeable as they refer to more or less 
the same thing: an image, and how a state is perceived. Thus, an improved image 
could lead to a ‘troop-contributor’ being noticed and appreciated by other states or 
security and defense structures as a trustworthy, reliable, credible, and cooperative 
partner and ally.28 As such, ‘image’ will constitute yet another conceptual building-
block for the purposes of this thesis, referring to one or all of the before mentioned 
characteristics. 
Building on what was discussed with regard to the ‘logic of images’, we can 
turn to Habermas (1987) in order to get more flesh on our skeleton, especially in 
regard to how ‘influence’ and ‘prestige’ go together. In his Theory of 
Communicative Action, Habermas (1987:181) holds that both prestige and 
influence can constitute primitive generators of “a willingness to follow”. When 
translated to the case in question, we can understand this accordingly: both 
‘influence’ and ‘prestige’ may lead to compliance with requests. However, this 
understanding may cause confusion, as we have already operationalized ‘influence’ 
with such compliance. Does that then mean that ‘influence’ and ‘prestige’ are the 
same? Or merely that they may generate the same effects? Not necessarily. Here it 
might be helpful to remember that we have defined ‘influence’ as an ability, 
whereas ‘prestige’ – like reputation or status – is understood as others’ perception 
of actor A. Moreover, when we reiterate that images (i.e. prestige) may make actor 
B more willing to cooperate with actor A, the slight difference between the two 
might become clearer.  
Hence, we might conclude that ‘prestige’ etc. – due to B’s increased willingness 
to cooperate with a ‘troop-contributing’ state, thus may lead directly to A’s 
‘potential influence’, as B would be more willing to comply with A’s request. 
However, the important distinction here is that ‘prestige’ and ‘influence’ (either 
potential or actual) are not the same, as ‘prestige’ should rather be understood to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
28 The adjectives may flourish, but they are assumed to be positive if they are to have any relevance for the case. 
If a state would get bad reputation from an operation (political risk failure or illegitimate objectives) it is rather 
expected that this would go in the opposite direction: namely that doors could be closed (Jervis 1989). However, 
that should be subject to another study, and will therefore not be dealt with here. 
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possibly lead to ‘potential influence’, and ‘influence’ as such may be regarded a 
possible effect of ‘prestige’. 
Furthermore, we can once again draw inspiration from Habermas (1987:181) 
who holds that ‘prestige’ and ‘influence’ are interdependent variables. While 
‘prestige’ enhances ‘influence’, ‘influence’ ay also enhance ‘prestige’, although it 
is possible to distinguish them based on their differing sources. According to 
Habermas, ‘prestige’ is connected to personal attributes such as physical strength, 
attractiveness, technical-practical skills and abilities, credibility and reliability (here 
understood as ‘substantial troop-contributions’ and a reputation and recognition as 
a trustworthy and accountable partner), whereas ‘influence’ is based on disposition 
over resources such as property and knowledge29 -  here understood as inter alia 
access and information. As such, we can perhaps expect that for example by having 
knowledge, a state can make better decisions that in turn lead to more or upheld 
‘prestige’. Then again, with ‘prestige’ it might get easier to get access and hold of 
information, which might lead to ‘influence’ again (if competence and willingness 
to convert it from the mere possession of knowledge to ‘actual influence’). 
However, this relationship is not so clear cut. As we will see, willingness to exert 
influence is also expected to play a role her, and the same goes for the importance 
of information and access. 
5.2.3 The Willingness to Exert ‘Influence’ 
A final notion that needs to be addressed is whether or not there exist a willingness 
to exert ‘influence’ on the part of the ‘troop-contributing’ state. In this regard there 
are indications in the literature that in connection with Norwegian ‘troop-
contributions’ to NATO-led operations in general (Græger forthcoming), and in 
particular in Libya in 2011 (Henriksen 2013), Norway to a surprisingly low degree 
actually sought to use these contributions to influence NATO decisions and 
strategies, or military positions of importance to Norway. Dag Henriksen (2013:51) 
claims that this is due to a lack of competence and willingness to take on 
responsibility from Norwegian side. Former Chief of Defense, Sverre Diesen (2012, 
in Græger forthcoming) point to another complementary explanation, claiming that 
small states like Norway primarily send troops to international operations for 
security policy reasons – mainly to uphold solidarity, thus leaving operational 
concerns to NATO. Although both Diesen and Henriksen refer to the willingness 
to influence at the tactical and operational military level, whether a ‘troop-
contributing’ state is actually willing to exert ‘influence’ could possibly be a factor 
at play also at the political level. 
Once again, we slightly touched upon this already in the ‘influence’-chapter 
when we underlined that there is a conceptual link- though not causal – between the 
‘influence’-holder’s will and the ‘influence’-subject’s actions (Zimmerling 2005). 
This is moreover connected to whether it is ‘actual influence’ or ‘potential 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
29 Here, ‘influence’ is attributed to the flow of communication (Habermas 1987:181). 
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influence’ that we are talking about. When a request has been made from A to B, 
this in itself constitute a willingness to achieve something, and when it is complied 
with we are talking about ‘actual influence’. However, if B would be willing to 
comply with a request from A, but has not received any requests yet, A has a 
‘potential influence’ over B. In this regard, as a request has not actually been made, 
thus indicating that A does not have the will to take advantage of the potential it has 
to gain ‘actual influence’. As such, it seems like an intervening variable comes to 
show: the willingness of actor A to convert ‘potential influence’ to ‘actual 
influence’, or simply ‘the willingness to exert influence’. This is thus also linked to 
whether actor A has any interest in affecting the policy after all. 
5.2.4 Gathering the Threads: The Possible Anatomy of ‘Troops for 
Influence’ 
Having pulled many threads and dived into various discussions on essential factors 
that are deemed to play a role in the alleged – and complicated – relationship 
between ‘troops’ and ‘influence’, a first attempt at a tentative analytical model for 
the ‘troops for influence’-assumption is hereby presented: 
 
 
(Figure 1) 
The model takes as a starting point what we have derived from the arguments 
of the various authors presented in the discussions on both ‘influence’, ‘troops’, as 
well as on the link between these two and other intervening variables. In addition, 
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it incorporates the different types and levels and types of ‘influence’, while ‘troop-
contributions’ is here meant to be fixed as a substantial ‘troop-contribution’ in 
accordance with the definition chosen in the chapter on ‘troops’. The ‘influence’ in 
the model can be either what we have called ‘formal influence’ on the map (all 
‘influence’-types in the implementation stage), or ‘informal influence’ – which is 
linked to the decision-shaping or making phases of the decision-making process. 
As such, it incorporates all our conceptual building-blocks that were developed in 
previous chapters of the thesis. That said, we will now turn to illustrating this 
complex attempt at an analytical model. 
First things first: a substantial ‘troop-contribution’ is thought to lead to three 
things. First, it leads to what we have named ‘formal information and access,’ that 
is, information and access that is granted to the ‘troop-contributing’ state on paper 
as a direct effect of its participation. This could be the Committee of Contributors, 
or as Græger (forthcoming:10) says: a place at the table. In turn, this ‘formal 
information and access,’ may lead to ‘actual influence’ in virtue of having the 
formal opportunity to put one’s foot down, and thereby make the others comply 
with one’s requests. For instance, at the tactical level, if a particular assignments 
does not respect a ‘troop-contributing’ state’s caveats, it may “use a red card” 
(Henriksen 2013). Second, ‘troop-contributions’ are expected to lead to ‘potential 
influence’, as Cialdini (2009) argues that the other states will feel indebted to the 
‘troop-contributor’, and thereby be willing to comply to A’s request. Third, ‘troop-
contributions’ might lead to and improved image, that is ‘prestige’ etc. This might 
be because the ‘troop-contributor’ exhibits for instance a cooperative spirit and the 
others perceive if it as trustworthy, reliable and credible (indicated by inter alia 
Fermann 2007 and Græger forthcoming). ‘An image’ may also exist independently 
of ‘troop-contributions’, but may be further enhanced or maintained as a result of 
participation. 
Once ‘image’ is achieved, it may 1) lead to ‘potential influence’ thanks to an 
increased willingness of the other states to cooperate (Jervis 1989); 2) it may lead 
to ‘informal information and access,’ for the same reason as in the former, but it 
may be materialized in terms of for instance invitations to meetings, rather than a 
mere willingness to comply with a request for such a meeting; or 3) to ‘actual 
influence’. The latter link would be derived from Habermas (1978), and constitutes 
a bi-directional process where ‘actual influence’ may also lead to ‘prestige’. In 
short: information makes better choices which might lead to ‘prestige’, and 
‘prestige’ as already explained may thanks to a more cooperative spirit towards the 
‘troop-contributing’ state lead to more open doors. 
In addition to deriving from ‘troop-contributions, ‘potential influence’ may 
moreover stem from ‘formal influence and access,’ if – and only if – there is 
‘competence’ to take advantage of this information and access. As Solem 2012 (in 
Henriksen 2013) notes, even though you have a seat at the table (both formally and 
informally), in order to actually exert influence and have your voice heard, you need 
to have ‘competence’. This is in line with the arguments of Mokken & Stokman 
(1975) who underline that information must be thoroughly aggregated, organized 
and mixed with expertise, before it can actually lead to ‘influence’ – taking 
advantage of the ‘window of opportunity’ (Kingdon 2011). 
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Moreover, ‘potential influence’ may in turn lead to ‘actual influence’, but again 
this relationship is dependent on an intervening variable: that of ‘willingness to 
exert influence’, as indicated in Henriksen (2013) and Græger (forthcoming). 
Thereinafter, ‘actual influence’ could lead to ‘informal information and access,’ 
that is the actual informal meetings and documents that the ‘troop-contributing’ 
state now may get hold of. However, worth mentioning here is that by ‘informal 
access and information’, it is not the operationalization of ‘actual influence’ as 
compliance with a request for access to meetings or insight to documents, but rather 
that other states might be more willing to cooperate and therefore also invite the 
‘troop-contributing’ state to meetings instead of the latter asking for it. Finally, 
‘informal information and access,’ may also lead to ‘potential influence’, 
constituting the important enabling conditions for ‘influence’ (Mokken & Stokman 
1975). However, as with ‘formal information and access’, this is also dependent on 
the intervening factor of ‘competence’ for the same reasons.  
Before continuing with the background chapter and the up-coming pilot-study, 
it must be noted that the ‘influence relationship’ simply is determined by who 
constitutes the actor B that is willing to comply with A’s request. 
 
 
 
 
  42 
6 Analysis: Norway in Operation 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta 
Based on the available empirical material as well as previous research, we can at 
least make some observations and find certain indications that might illustrate our 
tentative analytical model and conceptual-building-blocks. In achieving this, the 
Norwegian experience as a third-state ‘troop-contributor’ to Operation Atalanta will 
be applied, subsequent to a short background on the operation and Norwegian 
contribution itself. 
6.1 Background: Operation Atalanta and the 
Norwegian Contribution 
Operation EU Naval Force Atalanta (hereinafter referred to as ‘Atalanta’) is the 
EU’s counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia, which was launched on 
December 8, 2009 within the framework of the CSDP. It is the EU’s first naval 
operation, and is one of the most high-profile CSDP-operations (Koutrakos 
2013:120). The operation is mandated and conducted by the EU Council Joint 
Action (2008/851/CFSP) – in accordance with the relevant UNSC’s resolutions 
(Resolutions 1816 (2008) & 1838 (2008)) and International Law. The objective of 
the operation is to “deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off 
the Somali coast” (EUNAVFOR 2014). 
In Atlanta, Norway made its biggest contribution to an EU led military or 
civilian operation up-to this date, both in terms of personnel, equipment, and 
measured in economic costs. In total, Norway contributed with a about 155 
personnel and a Warship (Fridtjof Nansen), 2 personnel to a Swedish Command 
Ship, 1 personnel to the EUNAVFOR Operational Headquarter (OHQ) located in 
Northwood, as well as 2 personnel to the Maritime Security Centre – amounting to 
a total of 182 million Norwegian coroner30 (MFA 2012#2:11). The Norwegian 
participation began in August 2009, and ended in January 2010 (Norwegian Armed 
Forces 2013#2). In line with our definition of ‘troops’, it feels safe to say that the 
Norwegian contribution constituted a substantial ‘troop-contribution’. Having 
established that, we now turn to the analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
30 Please note: this is an estimated and tentative number on behalf of the MFA. 
  43 
6.2 The Role of ‘Image’ 
First of all, the empirical material backs up the argument that ‘troop-contributions’ 
may come with an improved, or maintained, image of the ‘troop-contributing’ state 
among the other Member States and the EU. For instance, in a Council Conclusion 
on Operation Atlanta, the Council “(…) welcomed the growing participation of 
third states” (the Council 2009). This is only a couple of months after Norway’s 
contribution had been enacted (in August 2009) – as the first third-state to 
contribute to the operation (EUNAVFOR 2014), thereby indicating that Norway’s 
participation was highly welcomed. In another Council Conclusion from 2010, 
Norway’s contribution was once again mentioned in the same manner (the Council 
2010). Thus, as the EU openly and officially welcomed Norwegian participation, 
we can interpret it as Norway getting an improved image. This is in line with the 
Norwegian government’s understanding that “one central way in which Norway 
may get influence is precisely through visible participation in EU-led operations” 
(MoD 2008). In addition to positive feedback, it moreover seems like Norway is 
perceived as a cooperative and constructive partner with a positive standing 
(Hugaas 2014, interview).  
Second, as Norway is met with positive attitudes, this in turn apparently makes 
both the EU bureaucracy and other Member States more willing to cooperate with 
Norway, and accommodate its requests and inquiries – hence, ‘potential influence’. 
At least, Hugaas (2014) is of the perception that  
[W]hen Norway contributes with troops to EU-operations, Norway is granted a certain 
‘goodwill’ as we exhibit solidarity with the EU by contributing to stability in unstable 
parts of the world with problematic needs and challenges that need to be addressed 
(…) In general, the impression is that troop-contributions over a certain time-period 
makes the EU and individual Member States more forthcoming and interested in 
meeting and exchanging views also with non-members (…) Although national 
delegations and the EU-institutions have busy schedules, my general impression is that 
when we ask for meetings this is normally positively met (…)  It is reasonable to believe 
that our participation in Operation Atalanta has contributed to this attitude (Hugaas 
2014, interview).  
 
Thus, it appears like ‘troop-contributions’ might lead to enhanced status or 
recognition – whatever you might call it – which in turn can lead to both ‘potential 
influence’ as well as ‘actual influence’, where the EU and Member States comply 
with Norway’s inquiries for inter alia meetings. At the same time, there are 
indications that it might be granting Norway access and information through 
informal channels as well. 
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6.3 The Role of ‘Access and Information’ 
On ‘Formal Influence’ 
In accordance with the Framework Agreement from 2004 steering the possible 
participation of Norway in EU’s crisis management operations, Norway as a ‘troop-
contributor’ at least on paper enjoyed the same rights and obligations in terms of 
the day-to-day management of the operation as participating EU Member States 
(Articles 6(5) and 10(3) FA). Thus, Norway was granted formal access and 
information through its participation in both the political and military 
implementation stages of the operation (Knutsen 2010; Tardy 2014), such as in the 
Committee of Contributors. However, Norway had to abide by the EU decisions 
founding and extending it (Framework Agreement 2004). According to Hugaas 
(2014, interview), the Committee of Contributors grants Norway access to a 
meeting-forum in which security and defense issues with relevance also beyond the 
specific operation could be discussed. This is moreover identified as an important 
arena for information exchange (MFA 2012#2:11). Here, issues of a more general 
nature linked to the operation in question might also come up – thus simultaneously 
constituting an opportunity for Norway to possibly get a sense of what is going on 
with the EU. However, up until this point, Norway has no formal opportunities to 
affect the CSDP, nor to be heard or even addressed (Sjursen 2003; Knutsen 2010).  
At the military level, the communication is more frequent, in particular between 
the Army’s Operational Headquarter in Norway and the OHQ in Northwood. From 
a logical stand-point, one could argue that at this stage, it would be rather surprising 
if a contributing third-state did not have a say in the daily running of the operation 
as it puts its personnel and equipment on the line, in the same way as the ‘troop-
contributing’ Member States. Actually, when it comes to questions or issues of 
tactical or operational character, Hugaas (2014, interview) is of the impression that 
members and non-members are treated equally. It therefore seems quite safe to 
believe that Norway has both ‘potential- and actual influence’ in the ‘formal stages’ 
(i.e. implementation), as its voice will be as loud as any others at the political 
operational level, and the military operational and tactical level.  
On ‘Informal Influence’ 
With regard to decision-shaping, however, Hugaas (2014, interview) confirms 
our prediction that there normally would be a lot of informal interaction and 
exchange of information in this phase of the decision-making process, and that 
requests for information from Norway generally would be met with a very positive 
attitude, both by national delegations and the EU system such as the EEAS. This 
would give Norway a better basis for making a decision regarding participation in 
specific operations. As such, it would first constitute an opportunity for Norway to 
exert ‘influence’ – if willing and competent to do so. This could be in line with what 
Petersen et al. (2012:307) calls ‘diplomatic lobbying’, or what Howorth (2011:202) 
calls a “supranational intergovernmentalism”: an increasing tendency for the CSDP 
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to be influenced and formulated from Brussels. Second, what is moreover 
highlighted is that both multilateral and bilateral ‘influence-relationships’ are 
present, in which both the EU (extended by its institutions) and individual Member 
States appear willing to comply with Norwegian requests – in particular requested 
access and information. 
Moreover, there is also an impression that it has become much easier the last 
year to arrange informal interaction with the EU, such as with the Council 
Secretariat and European Commission. In fact, Knutsen (2010:7) claims that the 
EU in general has become much more open to third-states, partly because the EU 
is dependent on their inclusion in order to succeed with its operations. At least, it 
does not come across like Norway has any difficulty arranging informal exchanges, 
but there is less to say about how this access and information is actually used. 
6.4 The ‘Willingness to Exert Influence’ 
There are also indications in the empirical material that ‘willingness to exert 
influence’ may furthermore constitute an important consideration. As for instance 
Henriksen (2013) and Græger (forthcoming) have hinted at, a willingness to 
actually exert ‘influence’ is a necessary condition for ‘potential influence’ to be 
converted into ‘actual influence’. However, based on the empirical data, there are 
two dimensions to this. First, there seems to be a logic of ‘choosing ones battles’ at 
play. As Hugaas (2014) points out: 
as a non-EU member, there are probably limits for how strongly Norway should 
express her  opinion on EU and its common security and defense policy more in 
general (…) [As such] Norway is quite reticent when it comes to expressing our 
views or make statements regarding the EU’s CSDP engagements (Hugaas 2014, 
interview). 
Secondly, today there is a broad consensus between Norway and the EU on how 
to handle the most important security challenges and priorities (Knutsen 2010:7; 
MFA 2012#1:30; Rieker 2012:16). As such, there might not be a strong incentive 
to insert a lot of resources into informal channels for issues that are quite close to 
the Norwegian standpoint after all. This suggests that ‘willingness’ might prove an 
essential condition for actually exerting ‘influence’. Moreover, if a security and 
defense issue that clearly concerns Norway should be raised, Hugaas (2014, 
interview) is quite confident that Norway’s concerns at least would be met with 
goodwill and understanding, and that the EU would consider carefully how 
Norwegian views possibly could be taken into account. This in turn indicates that 
with this knowledge, added to competence, Norway could gain an opportunity to 
exert ‘influence’ – if willing and competent to do so.  
Still, there are tangible examples that Norway actively has sought to gain more 
access and information in the EU’s security and defense procedures, as it is deemed 
important go gain insight into these processes in order to for instance contribute in 
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EU-led operations in the first place (Devold 2004; Europaportalen 2013). One such 
example may be the Norwegian non-paper, which was informally presented in 
December 2013, at the first European Council meeting on Defense in 8 years. Here, 
it is inter alia highlighted that Norway would like more intensified cooperation-
procedures and to be informed at an earlier stage, in order to participate in the 
discussions on European security and defense (A Norwegian Perspective 2013). 
The impression is that the paper was welcomed and generally perceived as positive 
and constructive, and that the views expressed have been carefully considered and 
to a certain extent taken into account by the EU (Hugaas 2014, interview).  
6.5 Norway: an Active Third-State Contributor 
Finally, yet another interesting notion is the total number and impact of Norwegian 
contributions, and Norway’s general reputation for being cooperative and 
constructive stemming therefrom. In fact, Norway shows a unique position as a 
non-member with high levels of participation and compliance in the field of CSDP 
(Sjursen 2003:49). More specifically, Norway has contributed to more CSDP 
operations than any other contributing third country since the policy’s inception in 
1999 – amounting to 10 out of 24 EU operations by 2012 (Knutsen 2010; Rieker 
2012:15; Sved 2012). While Norway has participated in seven civil missions, three 
of these were military operations, including Operation Atalanta. In addition, by 
2015 Norway will make its third troop-contribution to the Swedish-led EUBG on 
stand-by (MoD 2014).  
What this indicates in turn, is that it might be interesting to look at the number 
of engagements that a state contributes to over a period of time, which according to 
Johansen et al. 2007:18) increase recognition over time. Although it is difficult to 
dedicate increased goodwill and recognition to one isolated event, “the fact that 
[Norway] contributes to EU operations over a longer period of time will in turn 
contribute to others’ perception of Norway as a reliable and interesting partner in 
the field of security and defense, and also more in general” (Hugaas 2014, 
interview). As such, repeated and continuous  contributions to EU operations might 
increase both the ‘potential influence’ and image of Norway This could also be 
illustrated from the opposite angle if Norway did not participate at all, which might 
have meant that relations could be deteriorated (Græger forthcoming) or even 
worse: that it might lead to a marginalization (Rieker 2006). 
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7 Conclusion 
This thesis has set out to gain an understanding of the acclaimed ‘troops for 
influence’-assumption, with the aim of developing preliminary conceptual 
building-blocks and a tentative analytical model for future theory development of a 
‘troops for influence’-theory. To this end, the assumption was first deconstructed, 
and its main components: ‘troops’ and ‘influence’ were addressed in turn. A 
specific definition of each was chosen in order to fulfil the aim of the thesis, 
simultaneously laying the ground for the fundamental conceptual building-blocks 
in this thesis. In this connection, it was argued that ‘troops’ would be understood as 
‘substantial troop-contributions to an international military operation within the 
framework of a security and defense structure’. The argument presented is that 
sizeable, capable and/or deployable troop-contributions where high levels of risk 
are present are more likely to lead to ‘influence’ and ‘prestige’.  
In turn, as it was deemed necessary with a tangible and measureable definition 
respecting the feasibility of the study, ‘influence’ was defined as ‘actor A’s ability 
to get actor B to comply with A’s request”, building on inter alia Robert Dahl 
(1957) and Robert Cialdini (2009). ‘Influence’ was thereinafter identified as 
different relationships and types, which can be found at different levels in the 
decision-making process: bilateral vs. multilateral ‘influence relationships’; 
‘political strategic- or operational influence’ vs.  ‘military operational- or tactical 
influence’; ‘formal influence’ vs. ‘informal influence’; and ‘potential influence’ vs. 
‘actual influence’. These different levels and types of ‘influence’ simultaneously 
represent an important contribution of conceptual building-blocks. 
Second, attention was brought to the alleged link between ‘troops and 
‘influence’, seeking to understand both why one could expect ‘troops’ to lead to 
‘influence’ as well as how this complex relationship might look like in practice. 
The realist (Morgenthau 1993; Art 1996)-, influence (Cialdini 2009)-, and image 
(Jervis 1989)- perspectives in a complementary manner highlighted the importance 
of different aspects in understanding the link: respectively military capabilities as a 
determinant of actual political ‘influence’; the feeling of indebtedness; and the fact 
that improved or maintained image may increase willingness to cooperate with that 
state. Moreover, based on the conceptual and theoretical discussions throughout the 
thesis, additional conceptual building-blocks such as ‘image’, ‘information and 
access’, ‘willingness to exert influence’ and ‘competence’ were identified. 
Third, when combined, all the conceptual building-blocks developed in the 
thesis, laid down the foundation for the proposed tentative analytical model for how 
the assumption of ‘troops for influence’ might look like in practice for third-states 
in particular (Figure 1). Additional help and inspiration was moreover drawn from 
inter alia Habermas’ (1987) theory of communicative action, and Mokken & 
Stokman’s (1975) ‘influence and power’ for ideas on how all the conceptual 
  48 
building-blocks could be connected. The proposed analytical model was afterwards 
subject to a preliminary “test-case” represented by Norway’s contribution to 
Operation Atalanta from 2009-2010, tentatively illustrating its relevance. 
Correspondingly, the “test-case” has provided the debate with helpful 
indications on the relevance of our model and concepts, although some are more 
convincing than others. To start with, the empirical material has neither been 
expected to fully support or illustrate how the assumption of ‘troops for influence’ 
is to unfold in practice. Nor was it believed capable of proving that one thing 
necessarily leads to another; that there are no other explanatory factors involved 
and interfering, such as the total sum of contributions; or  that the for instance 
‘influence’ exclusively stems from ‘troop-contributions’ to a particular operation 
and nothing else. Still, what the empirical material can provide however, is 
indications of for instance the notion of ‘image’ as a plausible consequence of 
substantial ‘troop-contributions’ that apparently operates as an important facilitator 
for exerting influence and an opener of doors and portfolios. Moreover, there are 
also indicators that underline the relevance of ‘willingness to exert influence’ and 
the importance of both formal and informal ‘access and information’ – both as a 
result of ‘actual influence’, and a facilitator for ‘potential influence’. ‘Competence’ 
on the other hand, was mainly ignored in the empirical material, as was the bi-
directional process between ‘actual influence’ and ‘image’. However, ‘competence’ 
is at least still believed to play an important role in how ‘influential’ ‘troop-
contributing’ states might be – at least from a theoretical point of view, and cannot 
therefore be discarded simply on the grounds of a preliminary “test-case”. 
More specifically, there were indications that substantial ‘troop-contributions’ 
might at least lead to both military operational- and tactical-, as well as political 
operational- ‘influence’ (formal) for ‘troop-contributing’ third-states, but also 
instances of ‘informal influence’ were hinted at. Moreover, there were also 
indications of both potential- and actual ‘influence’, as well as bilateral and 
multilateral ‘influence-relationships’. However, whether there is a clear connection 
to the ‘troop-contribution’ outside the formal arena, is highly uncertain. 
The conclusion is therefore, that although unable to make any stringent claims 
concerning possible causal mechanisms with regard to the ‘troops for influence’-
assumption, the proposed tentative analytical model and conceptual building-
blocks still manage to provide indications of imagined connections, and at least 
represent an attempt at laying the ground-work for future theory development and 
testing. Moreover, although mainly focusing on third-states’ ‘troop-contributions’, 
the general discussions throughout the thesis – perhaps with the exception of the 
final analytical model – may generate a starting-point also for investigating and 
understanding the assumption with regard to Member States as well. Further 
research with emphasis on the variance in ‘troops’ and operations is also needed. 
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